We saw from the beginning how Leibnitz arrived at this conception. Each monad is really possessed of the power of representation， and is as such a representation of the universe， therefore implicitly the totality of the whole world. But at the same time this representation is not in consciousness； the naked monad is implicitly the universe， and difference is the development of this totality in it.(31) What develops itself therein is at the same time in harmony with all other developments； all is one harmony. “In the universe all things are closely knit together， they are in one piece， like an ocean： the slightest movement transmits its influence far and wide all around.”(32) From a single grain of sand， Leibnitz holds， the whole universe might be comprehended in its entire development if we only knew the sand grain thoroughly. There is not really much in all this， though it sounds very fine； for the rest of the universe is considerably more than a grain of sand， well though we knew it， and considerably different therefrom. To say that its essence is the universe is mere empty talk： for the fact is that the universe as essence is not the universe. To the sand grain much must be added which is not present； and since thought adds more than all the grains of sand that exist， the universe and its development may in this way certainly be comprehended. Thus according to Leibnitz every monad has or is the representation of the entire universe， which is the same as saying that it is really representation in general； but at the same time it is a determinate representation， by means of which it comes to be this particular monad， therefore it is representation according to its particular situation and circumstances.(33)The representations of the monad in itself， which constitute its universe， develop themselves from themselves， as the spiritual element in it， according to the laws of their own activity and desire， just as the movements of their outer world do according to laws of bodies； hence liberty is nothing other than this spontaneity of immanent development， but as in consciousness. The magnetic needle， on the contrary， has only spontaneity without consciousness， and consequently without freedom. For， says Leibnitz， the nature of the magnetic needle is to turn to the north； if it had consciousness it would imagine that this was its self-determination； it would thus have the will to move round in accordance with its nature.(34) But it is clear that in the course of conscious representations there is involved no necessary connection， but contingency and want of sequence are to be found， the reason of this according to Leibnitz (Oper. T. II. P. I. p. 75) being “because the nature of a created substance implies that it changes incessantly according to a certain order， which order guides it spontaneously (spontanément) in all the circumstances which befall it； so that one who sees all things recognizes in the present condition of substance the past also and the future. The law of order， which determines the individuality of the particular substance， has an exact reference to what takes place in every other substance and in the whole universe.” The meaning of this is that the monad is not a thing apart， or that there are two views of it， the one making it out as spontaneously generating its representations， so far as form is concerned， and the other making it out to be a moment of the whole of necessity； Spinoza would call this regarding it from both sides. An organic whole， a human being， is thus for instance the assertion of his aim from out of himself： at the same time the being directed on something else is involved in his Notion.
He represents this and that to himself， he wills this and that； his activity employs itself and brings about changes. His inward determination thus becomes corporeal determination， and then change going beyond himself； he appears as cause， influencing other monads. But this Being-for-another is only an appearance. For the other， i.e.， the actual， in so far as the monad determines it or makes it negative， is the passive element which the monad has in itself： all moments are indeed contained therein， and for that very reason it has no need of other monads， but only of the laws of the monads in itself. But if the Being-for-another is mere appearance， the same may be said of Being-for-self； for this has significance only in reference to Being-for-another.
