In the place of thought we consequently find the Notion now making its appearance. Just as with the Stoics determinateness is held to be an object of thought， we have in modern times this same manifestation of thought as the unmoved form of simplicity. Only here the image or inner consciousness of totality is present， the absolute spirit which the world has before it as its truth and to whose Notion it makes its way - this is another inward principle， another implicitude of mind which， it endeavours to bring forth from itself and for itself， so that reason is a comprehension of the same， or has the certitude of being all reality. With the ancients reason， as the implicit and explicit Being of consciousness， had only an ethereal and formal existence as language， but here it has certainty as existent substance. Hence with Descartes there is the unity of the Notion and Being， and with Spinoza the universal reality. The first commencement of the Notion of the movement of fixed thoughts in themselves is found in this， that the movement which， as method， simply falls outside its object， comes within it， or that self-consciousness comes within thought.
Thought is implicitude without explicitude， an objective mode bearing no resemblance to a sensuous thing； and yet it is quite different from the actuality of self-consciousness. This Notion which we now find entering into thought， has the three kinds of form which we still have to consider； in the first place it has that of individual self-consciousness or the formal conception generally； secondly， that of universal self-consciousness， which applies itself to all objects whether they be objects of thought， determinate conceptions， or have the form of actuality - that is to say it applies itself to what is established in thought， to the intellectual world with the riches of its determinations and looked on as a Beyond， or to the intellectual world in as far as it is its realisation， the world here and around us. It is in those two ways， and in those ways alone， that the actual Notion is present in the succeeding chapter； for not as yet is it in the third place to be found as taken back into thought， or as the self-thinking or thought of Notion. While that universal self-consciousness is， on the whole， a thought which grasps and comprehends， this third kind of thought is the Notion itself recognised as constituting reality in its essence， that is to say as Idealism. These three aspects again divide themselves as before into the three nations which alone count in the civilised world. The empirical and perfectly finite form of Notion pertains to the English； to the French belongs its form as making an attempt at everything， as establishing itself in its reality， abolishing all determination， and therefore being universal， unlimited， pure self-consciousness； and， lastly， to the German pertains the entering into itself of this implicitude， the thought of the absolute Notion.
1. Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosoph.， Vol. IV. Sec. II.， pp. 571-582； Tiedemann； Geist der speculativen Philos.， Vol. VI. pp. 511-518； Rixner： Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie， Vol. III. § 79， pp. 195， 196.
2. Wolf's Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott， der Welt und der Seele des Menschen (Halle， 1741)， Pt. I. chap. ii. § 114， 120， pp. 59， 60， 62， 63； chap. vi. § 575-581， 686， pp. 352-359， 425；chap. v. § 742， p. 463； § 926， p. 573； chap. vi. § 928， p. 574， seq.
3. Wolff's Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften， Pt. I.： Anfangsgründe der Baukunst， Pt. II. Prop. 8， p. 414； Problem 22， pp. 452， 453； Pt. II.： Anfangsgründe der Fortification， Pt. I. p. 570.
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding Chapter II. - Transition Period， A Idealism & Scepticism 1. BERKELEY.
This idealism， in which all external reality disappears， has before it the standpoint of Locke， and it proceeds directly from him. For we saw that to Locke the source of truth is experience， or Being as perceived. Now since this sensuous Being， as Being， has in it the quality of being for consciousness， we saw that it necessarily came to pass that in Locke's case some qualities， at least， were so determined that they were not in themselves， but only for another； and that colour， figure， &c.， had their ground only in the subject， in his particular organization. This Being-for-another， however， was not by him accepted as the Notion， but as falling within self-consciousness - i.e.， self-consciousness not looked on as universal， - not within mind， but within what is opposed to the implicit.
George Berkeley was born in 1684 at Kilcrin， near Thomastown， in the county of Kilkenny， Ireland： in 1754 he died as an English Bishop.(1) He wrote the “Theory of Vision，” 1709； “ATreatise concerning the principles of human knowledge，” 1710； “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous，” 1713. In 1784 his collected works were published in London in two quarto volumes.
