Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding Chapter II. - Transition Period C. French Philosophy We pass onto the French philosophy； the relation it bears to metaphysics is this， that while man as a metaphysician stands to himself in the attitude of a layman or outsider， French philosophy does away with the lay or outside position in regard alike to politics， religion， and philosophy. Two forms have to be mentioned which are of the greatest importance in respect to culture - French philosophy and the Aufkl？rung. With the English we saw a certain idealism only： this was either formal， as the mere general translation of Being into Being-for-another， i.e.， into perceptibility， or else what is implicit in this perceptibility， instincts， impulses， habits， &c. - blind determinate forces；a return into self-consciousness， which itself appears as a physical thing. In that first idealism the whole finitude and extension of appearances， of sensations， and likewise of thoughts and determinate fixed conceptions， remain just what they are in the unphilosophic consciousness. The scepticism of Hume makes all that is universal sink into habits and instincts， i.e.， it consists in a more simple synthesis of the phenomenal world； but these simpler elements， these instincts， impulses， and forces， are just as much a fixed present existence in self-consciousness， unspiritual， and without movement. The French philosophy has more life， more movement， more spirit； it would perhaps be more correct to describe it as full of life and spirit. It is the absolute Notion， which revolts against the whole reigning system of prevalent conceptions and established ideas， which overthrows all that has settled into fixity， and acquires the consciousness of perfect liberty.
At the root of this idealistic activity lies the certainty that whatever is， whatever counts for anything in itself， is all a matter of self-consciousness； and as to Notions (individual and isolated existences ruling actual self-consciousness)， such as the Notions of good and evil， of power and riches， and the fixed conceptions regarding faith in God and His relation to the world， His mode of government and， further， the duties of self-consciousness towards Him - that all these are not truths in themselves， having validity beyond the bounds of self-consciousness. All these forms， the real implicitude of the actual world and also of the supersensuous world， are therefore set aside in this spirit conscious of itself. It does not trouble itself seriously about those who admit the validity of these conceptions just as they are， and accept them as true， respecting them as independent and free apart from self-consciousness， but it speaks of such conceptions with intelligence and spirit， that is to say， it asserts that self-consciousness by its activity is the first to make anything of them， and to make that a something very different from what they profess to be； for the self-conscious spirit only intellectual relations， these processes of formation and movement by means of its self-consciousness， possess validity and interest. This is the character of the Notion in its actuality；what has reality for this all-perceiving and all-comprehending consciousness is held to be valid.
We must now consider what form existence takes for this absolutely comprehending self-consciousness. In the first place this Notion is fixed as the negative movement of the Notion only；the positive and simple， or existence， falls outside of this movement. There remains to the Notion no distinction， no content； for all determinate content is lost in that negativity. This empty existence is for us pure thought generally， what the French call être suprême， or if represented objectively as existent， and as in opposition to consciousness， it is matter. Absolute Being is therefore determined as matter， as empty objectivity， through a Notion which destroys all content and determination， and has as its object this universal alone. It is a Notion which acts only destructively， and does not again construct itself out of this matter or pure thought or pure substantiality. We here see so-called materialism and atheism freely emerge， as the necessary result of the pure comprehending self-consciousness. From one point of view there perishes in this negative movement all determination which represents spirit as something beyond self-consciousness， and more especially all determinations within the spirit， and also those which express it as spirit， indeed all the conceptions formed of it by faith， for which it has validity as an existent self-consciousness beyond self-consciousness - in short， all that is traditional or imposed by authority. There remains only a present， actual Being， for self-consciousness recognizes implicit existence only in the form which it has for self-consciousness， and in which it is actually known to itself； in matter， and matter as actively extending and realizing itself in multiplicity， i.e.， as nature. In the present I am conscious to myself of my reality， and consequently self-consciousness finds itself as matter， finds the soul to be material， and conceptions to be movements and changes in the inner organ of the brain， which result from external impressions on the senses. Thought is therefore a mode of the existence of matter. The One Substance of Spinoza， to which French materialism as naturalism is parallel， really finds its accomplishment here in this object as in all respects the ultimate； but while in Spinoza this category is a possession which we find ready to hand， here it appears as the result of the abstraction of the understanding proceeding from empiricism.
