Thus has the institution of the year VIII deviated (The France of the revolution corrected and decreed by Napoleon), no longer attaining its object. The prefects, formerly appointed to a department, like a pacier of the Middle Ages, imposed on it from above, ignorant of local passions, independent, qualified and fitted for the office, was, during fifty years, in general, able to remain the impartial minister of the law and of equity, maintaining the rights of each, and exacting from each his due, without heeding opinions and without respect to persons. Now he is obliged to become an accomplice of the ruling faction, govern for the advantage of some to the detriment of others, and to put into his scales, as a preponderating weight, every time he weighs judgment, a consideration for persons and opinions. At the same time, the entire administrative staff in his hands, and under his eye, deteriorates; each year, on the recommendation of a senator or deputy, he adds to it, or sees, intruders there, whose previous services are null, feeble in capacity and of weak integrity who do poor work or none at all, and who, to hold their post or get promoted, count not on their merits but on their sponsors. The rest, able and faithful functionaries of the old school, who are poor and to whom no path is open, become weary and lose their energy; they are no longer even certain of keeping their place; if they stay, it is for the dispatch of current business and because they cannot be dispensed with; perhaps to-morrow, however, they will cease to be considered indispensable;some political denunciation, or to give a political favorite a place, will put them by anticipation on the retired list. From now on they have two powers to consult, one, legitimate and natural, the authority of their administrative chiefs, and the other illegitimate and parasite, consisting of democratic influence from both above and below. For them, as for the prefect, public welfare descends to the second rank and the electoral interest mounts upward to the first rank. With them as with him self-respect, professional honor, the conscientious performance of duty, reciprocal loyalty go down;discipline relaxes, punctuality falters, and, as the saying goes, the great administrative edifice is no longer a well-kept house, but a barracks.
Naturally, under the democratic regime, the maintenance and service of this house becomes more and more costly;[38] for, owing to the additional centimes, it is the rich and well-to-do minority which defrays the larger portion of the expense. Owing to universal suffrage, the poor or half-poor majority which dominate the elections so that the large majority with impunity can overtax the minority. At Paris, the parliament and the government, elected by this numerical majority, contrive demands in its behalf, force expenditure, augment public works, schools, endowments, gratuities, prizes, a multiplication of offices to increase the number of their clients, while it never tires in decreeing, in the name of principles, works for show, theatrical, ruinous, and dangerous, the cost of which they do not care to know, and of which the social import escapes them.
Democracy, above as well as below, is short-sighted; it seizes whatever food it comes across, like an animal, with open jaws and head down; it refuses to anticipate and to calculate; it burdens the future and wastes every fortune it undertakes to manage, not alone that of the central state, but, again, those of all local societies. Up to the advent of universal suffrage, the administrators appointed above or elected below, in the department or in the commune, kept tight hold of the purse-strings; since 1848, especially since 1870, and still later, since the passage of the laws of 1882, which, in suppressing the obligatory consent of the heaviest taxed, let slip the last of these strings, this purse, wide open, is emptied in the street. - In 1851,[39] the departments, all together, expended 97 millions; in 1869, 192 millions; in 1881, 314 millions. In 1836, the communes, all together, save Paris, expended 117 millions, in 1862, 450 millions, in 1877, 676 millions. If we examine the receipts covering this expenditure, we find that the additional centimes which supplied the local budgets, in 1820, with 80 millions, and, in 1850, with 131millions, supplied them, in 1870, with 249 millions, in 1880, with 318millions, and, in 1887, with 364 millions. The annual increase, therefore, of these superadded centimes to the principal of the direct taxes is enormous, and finally ends in an overflow. In 1874,[40] there were already 24 departments in which the sum of additional centimes reached or surpassed the sum of the principal. "In a very few years,"says an eminent economist,[41] "it is probable that, for nearly all of the departments," the overcharge will be similar. Already, for a long time, in the total of personal taxation,[42] the local budgets raised more than the state, and, in 1888, the principal of the tax real property, 183 millions, is less than the total of centimes joined with it, 196 millions. Coming generations are burdened over and beyond the present generation, while the sum of loans constantly increases, like that of taxation. The indebted communes, except Paris, owed, altogether, in 1868, 524 millions francs[43] , in 1871, 711 millions, and in 1878, 1322 millions francs.[44] Paris, in 1868, already owed 1326 millions, March 30, 1878, it owed 1988 millions. In this same Paris, the annual contribution of each inhabitant for local expenses was, at the end of the first Empire, in 1813, 37 francs per head, at the end of the Restoration,[45] francs, after the July monarchy, in 1848, 43 francs, and, at the end of the second Empire, in 1869, 94francs. In 1887,45 it is 110 francs per head. [46]
VIII. Final result in a tendency to bankruptcy.
