Let us go around the fold， which is an extensive one， and， through its extensions， reach into almost every nook of private life. - Each private domain， indeed， physical or moral， offers temptations for its neighbors to trespass on it， and， to keep this intact， demands the superior intervention of a third party. To acquire， to possess， to sell， to give， to bequeath， to contract between husband and wife， father， mother or child， between master or domestic， employer or employee， each act and each situation， involves rights limited by contiguous and adverse rights， and it is the State which sets up the boundary between them. Not that it creates this boundary； but， that this may be recognized， it draws the line and therefore enacts civil laws which it applies through its courts and gendarmes in such a way as to secure to each individual what belongs to him. The State stands， accordingly， as regulator and controller， not alone of private possessions， but also of the family and of domestic life； its authority is thus legitimately introduced into that reserved circle in which the individual will has entrenched itself， and， as is the habit of all great powers， once the circle is invaded， its tendency is to occupy it fully and entirely. - To this end， it invokes a new principle. Constituted as a moral personality， the same as a church， university， or charitable or scientific body， is not the State bound， like every corporate body that is to last for ages， to extend its vision far and near and prefer to private interests， which are only life-interests， the common interest (l'intérêt commun) which is eternal？ Is not this the superior end to which all others should be subordinated， and must this interest， which is supreme over all， be sacrificed to two troublesome instincts which are often unreasonable and sometimes dangerous； to conscience， which overflows in mystic madness， and to honor， which may lead to strife even to murderous duels？ - Certainly not， and first of all when， in its grandest works， the State， as legislator， regulates marriages， inheritances， and testaments， then it is not respect for the will of individuals which solely guides it； it does not content itself with obliging everybody to pay his debts， including even those which are tacit， involuntary and innate； it takes into account the public interest； it calculates remote probabilities， future contingencies， all results singly and collectively. Manifestly， in allowing or forbidding divorce， in extending or restricting what a man may dispose of by testament， in favoring or interdicting substitutions， it is chiefly in view of some political， economical or social advantage， either to refine or consolidate the union of the sexes， to implant in the family habits of discipline or sentiments of affection， to excite in children an initiatory spirit， or one of concord， to prepare for the nation a staff of natural chieftains， or an army of small proprietors， and always authorized by the universal assent. Moreover， and always with this universal assent， it does other things outside the task originally assigned to it， and nobody finds that it usurps when，* it coins money， * it regulates weights and measures， * it establishes quarantines， * on condition of an indemnity， it expropriates private property for public utility， * it builds lighthouses， harbors， dikes， canals， roads， * it defrays the cost of scientific expeditions， * it founds museums and public libraries；* at times， toleration is shown for its support of universities， schools， churches， and theaters， and， to justify fresh drafts on private purses for such objects， no reason is assigned for it but the common interest. (l'intérêt commun)- Why should it not， in like manner， take upon itself every enterprise for the benefit of all？ Why should it hesitate in commanding the execution of every work advantageous to the community， and why abstain from forbidding every harmful work？ Now please note that in human society every act or omission， even the most concealed or private， is either a loss or a gain to society. So if I neglect to take care of my property or of my health， of my intellect or of my soul， Iundermine or weaken in my person a member of the community which can only be rich， healthy and strong through the wealth， health and strength of his fellow members， so that， from this point of view， my private actions are all public benefits or public injuries. Why then， from this point of view， should the State scruple about prescribing some of these to me and forbidding others？ Why， in order to better exercise this right， and better fulfill this obligation， should it not constitute itself the universal contractor for labor， and the universal distributor of productions？ Why should it not become the sole agriculturist， manufacturer and merchant， the unique proprietor and administrator of all France？ - Precisely because this would be opposed to the common weal (l'intérêt de tous， the interest of everyone)[15]. Here the second principle， that advanced against individual independence， operates inversely， and， instead of being an adversary， it becomes a champion. Far from setting the State free， it puts another chain around its neck， and thus strengthens the fence within which modern conscience and modern honor have confined the public guardian.
V.
Direct common interest. - This consists in the absence of constraint.
- Two reasons in favor of freedom of action. - Character， in general， of the individual man. - Modern complication.
