THE ANTITHESIS OF USE VALUE AND EXCHANGE VALUE"The capacity for all products, whether natural or industrial, to contribute to man's subsistence is specifically termed use value; their capacity to be given in exchange for one another, exchange value.... How does use value become exchange value?... The genesis of the idea of (exchange) value has not been noted by economists with sufficient care. It is necessary, therefore, for us to dwell upon it. Since a very large number of the things I need occur in nature only in moderate quantities, or even not at all, I am forced to assist in the production of what I lack. And as I cannot set my hand to so many things, I shall propose to other men, my collaborators in various functions, to cede to me a part of their products in exchange for mine."(Proudhon, Vol.I, Chap.II)
M . Proudhon undertakes to explain to us first of all the double nature of value, the "distinction in value", the process by which use value is transformed into exchange value. It is necessary for us to dwell with M. Proudhon upon this act of transubstantiation. The following is how this act is accomplished, according to our author.
A very large number of products are not to be found in nature, they are products of industry. If man's needs go beyond nature's spontaneous production, he is forced to have recourse to industrial production. What is this industry in M. Proudhon's view? What is its origin? A single individual, feeling the need for a very great number of things, "cannot set his hand to so many things". So many things to produce presuppose at once more than one man's hand helping to produce them. Now, the moment you postulate more than one hand helping in production, you at once presuppose a whole production based on the division of labor. Thus need, as M. Proudhon presupposes it, itself presupposes the whole division of labor. In presupposing the division of labor, you get exchange, and, consequently, exchange value. One might as well have presupposed exchange value from the very beginning.
But M. Proudhon prefers to go the roundabout way. Let us follow him in all his detours, which always bring him back to his starting point.
In order to emerge from the condition in which everyone produces in isolation and to arrive at exchange, "I turn to my collaborators in various functions," says M. Proudhon. I, myself, then, have collaborators, all with different function. And yet, for all that, I and all the others, always according to M. Proudhon's supposition, have got no farther than the solitary and hardly social position of the Robinsons. The collaborators and the various functions, the division of labor and the exchange it implies, are already at hand.
To sum up: I have certain needs which are founded on the division of labor and on exchange. In presupposing these needs, M. Proudhon has thus presupposed exchange, exchange value, the very thing of which he purposes to "note the genesis with more care than other economists".
M. Proudhon might just as well have inverted the order of things, without in any way affecting the accuracy of his conclusions. To explain exchange value, we must have exchange. To explain exchange, we must have the division of labor. To explain the division of labor, we must have needs which render necessary the division of labor. To explain these needs, we must "presuppose" them, which is not to deny them -- contrary to the first axiom in M. Proudhon's prologue: "To presuppose God is to deny Him." (Prologue, p.1)How does M. Proudhon, who assumes the division of labor as the known, manage to explain exchange value, which for him is always the unknown?
"A man" sets out to "propose to other men, his collaborators in various functions", that they establish exchange, and make a distinction between ordinary value and exchange value. In accepting this proposed distinction, the collaborators have left M. Proudhon no other "care" than that of recording the fact, or marking, of "noting" in his treatise on political economy "the genesis of the idea of value". But he has still to explain to us the "genesis" of this proposal, to tell us finally how this single individual, this Robinson [Crusoe], suddenly had the idea of making "to his collaborators"a proposal of the type known and how these collaborators accepted it without the slightest protest.
M. Proudhon does not enter into these genealogical details. He merely places a sort of historical stamp upon the fact of exchange, by presenting it in the form of a motion, made by a third party, that exchange be established.
That is a sample of the "historical and descriptive method" of M. Proudhon, who professes a superb disdain for the "historical and descriptive methods" of the Adam Smiths and Ricardos.
Exchange has a history of its own. It has passed through different phases. There was a time, as in the Middle Ages, when only the superfluous, the excess of production over consumption, was exchanged.
There was again a time, when not only the superfluous, but all products, all industrial existence, had passed into commerce, when the whole of production depended on exchange. How are we to explain this second phase of exchange -- marketable value at its second power?
M. Proudhon would have a reply ready-made: Assume that a man has "proposed to other men, his collaborators in various functions", to raise marketable value to its second power.
Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated.
