Learning on the 13th that the enemy was retreating south, Buell ordered pursuit to be made immediately, for the purpose of overtaking Bragg, or of intercepting him if he should attempt to pass toward Somerset.Wood's division marched at midnight, and engaged the enemy at Stanford at daylight the next morning.The rest of Crittenden's and McCook's corps followed on the same road; Gilbert marching on the Lancaster road.The enemy was steadily pressed on the road to Cumberland Gap, but could not be brought to an engagement.McCook's and Gilbert's corps were halted at Crab Orchard, while Crittenden, with W.S.Smith's division, was sent in pursuit as far as London on the direct road to the Gap.It now appearing that Bragg did not intend to fight in the State, and the country beyond Crab Orchard being extremely barren and rough--no supplies existing in it--the pursuit was discontinued, and the Army of the Ohio was turned toward Bowling Green and Glasgow, preparatory to the advance to Nashville.
McCook's and Gilbert's corps were concentrated at the former place, and Crittenden's at the latter.This movement of the troops was made by Buell, who was confident that Bragg would concentrate in the vicinity of Nashville, and seek to recover that place, and to fight his great battle for the possession of Kentucky.
The military affairs of the nation at this time were unfortunately in charge of General Halleck, who had been called to Washington as Commander-in-Chief.On the retreat of Bragg from Kentucky, Halleck insisted that Buell should make a campaign into East Tennessee, a distance of two hundred and forty miles, over mountain and river, without any communication to the rear, except by wagon train, over almost impassable roads, the advance to be made in the face of the enemy, who, operating on his line of communications could move his entire command to defeat our advance in detail.Buell reported to the War Department that it was impossible to make the campaign as ordered, and knowing the necessity of protecting Nashville, he directed the concentration of his troops on the line of the railroad to that place.That road had been repaired up to Bowling Green, after the destruction of two months before, and here the troops received their needed supplies.On the 30th of October, Buell was relieved of the command of the Department of the Ohio, and Major-General William S.Rosecrans was, by the direction of the General-in-Chief, assigned to the command of the troops.The designation of the command being changed to that of the Department of the Cumberland.
It is a somewhat singular fact, that the campaign in Kentucky should have caused the most intense feeling in the opposing armies against their respective commanders.In the Federal army, after Buell allowed Bragg to move north from Munfordville without an engagement, the expressions of the troops against their commanding general were open, bitter, and almost universal, from the lowest to the highest.However, there was one who never for a moment lost faith, soldierly trust, and esteem for his commander, and he was of all persons in the command most competent to judge.This was General Thomas.He knew the great difficulties of Buell's position, how his place had been interfered with by Halleck, under whose command it was his misfortune early in the year to be; and later, how he was made to feel the power of this same man as a personal matter.Halleck, invested by the Administration with supreme powers, planned a campaign into East Tennessee, on paper in Washington, and ordered Buell to execute it.This, the latter, with full knowledge of the situation, refused to do, and quietly ordering his troops to the line of the railroad from whence they could be moved with the least delay, as needed, waited for the order he knew was pending for his removal.
General Buell was right in refusing to attack Bragg at Munfordville, or in fact at any time until he had placed his army north of the enemy, and received his own reinforcements from Louisville.Then this point was safe, and Nashville could not be imperiled by the defeat of our army.Buell made three dispositions for an engagement during the Kentucky campaign, but each time Bragg drew off except at Perryville, and here there was no design of the latter to fight, beyond checking Buell's advance, and gaining time for his troops to make their retreat from the State with all stores and material.
Bragg, from his closing remarks in his first report of the battle of Perryville, certainly did not consider--so far as the Confederacy was concerned--that the State was worth fighting for.Had he received the 20,000 new troops he was promised, instead of General Buell having his army increased by that number, then he would have struck quick and sharp.He left the State deeply disgusted with Kentucky, and took every occasion after that to show it.The account was even, however, as Bragg was not a favorite in that State.
