When we say, a thing is produced by nature; we mean that it is produced either without the agency of man, or, if by his agency, without its being his intention to produce that, which he, nevertheless, produces.Thus the fruit, which a tree cultivated with care in an orchard yields, is an artificial production, that yielded by another growing spontaneously in some wild, is a natural production.A path between two points marked out by rule and line is artificial.A footpath formed by the mere unconstrained passing of many people from one point to another, is natural, because, though equally with the former the work of man, it is not designedly formed by him.In this case it was his intention merely to pass from place to place, not to form a path by so passing.It is in this latter sense, that the production of national wealth is said to be the work of nature.It is said to be the intention of each individual in a nation, to advance merely his own wealth, and the tendency which the actions of all the individuals in a nation have to advance the sum of the national opulence, as it is said to make no part of their motives to action, is esteemed a work of nature, in the same manner as we may esteem a footpath, formed by the continual passing of people over some moor or heath, to be the work of nature.According to this view of the subject, it is the legislator alone, who can, of design, act with the view to advance the national opulence.It is held, however, that as this interference of the legislator disturbs the course which events would otherwise have taken, it acts in opposition to the course of nature, and, therefore, that the presumption is that it will be injurious.On the contrary, I hold, that a just analogy would rather lead us to infer that it will be beneficial.
It must be acknowledged that when man acts most successfully, it is thus that lie does act.tie never, indeed, seeks to conquer nature otherwise than by obeying her, but his aim, nevertheless, always is to conquer her.
By observing the order of events, he acquires the power of changing that order.He does so, by that which distinguishes him from other animals, the reasoning faculty, which so directed we term art, and without the aid of which so directed, we scarce attain any object.
But though art and nature are thus put in opposition to each other, the form of expression is more popular than correct.Were the changes which man every where produces on the course of events, contrary to the designs of nature, we may rest satisfied that she would not have given him powers sufficient to effect them.What we call a conquering or government of nature is to be held, in a more enlarged and truer sense, an acting in obedience to her designs, and man as a reasoning animal is rather to be considered as an instrument in her hands, through which she effects much of that change in the order of events, and consequent progress from good to better, that we may fairly hope is going on, than as a separate agent acting in opposition to her.In this sense all art may be said to be nature, as in another sense all nature may be said to be art.
Is it then a thing to be assumed, a priori, as next to demonstrable, that art, the art of the legislator, cannot operate so as to advance the prosperity of nations? That, of all the springs and principles actuating the movement of societies, it is the only one powerless to do good, or whose power can no otherwise be advantageously exerted than in checking its own propensity.to act? That though in every other department of human action it is called on to lead, yet here it must impose chains on itself and sit still? That though every where else nature willingly submits herself to its government, nay, seems to court it, yet here she commands it to rest a mere spectator, beholding her "working out her own ends in her own way?"The presumption, it seems to me, would rather be, that, though neither here nor elsewhere can man in wisdom oppose nature, yet here, as elsewhere, he is called on to direct her operations.That the result of a successful inquiry into the nature of wealth, would terminate in affording the means of exposing the errors that legislators had committed from not attending to all the circumstances connected with the growth of that wealth, whose progress it had been their aim to advance, and would so teach them, not that they ought to remain inactive, but how they may act safely, and advantageously;and that thus, it would maintain the analogy running through the whole of man's connexion with the trains of events going on about him, the course of which he governs by ascertaining exactly what it is.That here, as elsewhere, his advance in knowledge would show him his power, not his impotence.
According to the view of the nature of stock, and of the causes generating and adding to it, which has been given in the preceding book, it would seem that its increase is advanced:
I.By whatever promotes the general intelligence and morality of the society; and that, consequently, the moral and intellectual education of the people makes an important element in its progress:
II.By whatever promotes invention;
1.By.advancing the progress of science and art within the community;9.By the transfer from other communities of the sciences and arts there generated:
III.By whatever prevents the dissipation in luxury, of any portion of the funds of the community.
A full investigation of the modes in which the legislator may promote the increase of the stock of the community, would comprehend an examination of the manner in which he may operate in these several particulars, of the rules necessary for him to observe in each case, and an enumeration of instances, in which, according as his efforts have been judiciously or injudiciously exerted, he has succeeded or failed in his enterprises.
