The triumph of that cause, in aid of which war had been embraced, gave peace to the empire and to Europe.The annual expenditure was diminished by one half, and the nation was no longer restrained, but in comparatively a very trifling degree, from participating in all those advantages, which, in every instance, one country, according to prevailing notions, is supposed to gain by free intercourse with another.But, though markets for the manufacture, and channels for the commerce of the kingdom were largely multiplied, its resources, instead of augmenting, seemed diminishing.The whole fabric of society seemed ready to sink under the pressure of some new burden,ruin began to threaten, often to overwhelm the man of capital,want to look industry in the face.In vain were taxes to a large amount repealed, in vain were endeavors made to trace the depression of the times to mere revolutions in the channels of trade, and to other temporary causes, and hopes held out that they would speedily pass away.The evil proved to be not partial and temporary, but pervading and permanent.Far from confidence in the modern science being shaken by a result contrary to all its principles, it was resolved to seek a remedy for the acknowledged distress, by adopting largely the policy which this science inculcates.
It cannot be denied that the results of the experiment, as far as it has hitherto been carried, have been in the whole, unhappy.The events which have followed, not to say flowed from recent enactments, regulating the internal and external commerce of the nation, have been at least unfortunate.
The operations of the banking system, and the extension of general confidence and security in all transactions, which that system is calculated to afford, seem clogged and restrained.The returns which industry and capital receive, have been still farther diminished.Wealth is barren.Labor, plied with all the skill, and more than all the assiduity to which human nature is long adequate, does not always keep famine at a distance.
It is natural that these circumstances should beget a sort of feeling of doubt.That, without pretending to question the general truth of the system established by Adam Smith, many should yet ask themselves, is the path which he has pointed out, truly that which always leads directly to the wealth of nations? In this temper of the public mind, I am inclined to hope that the application of new principles to a reconsideration of the whole subject, may be conceived to be an undertaking deserving, at least of being examined, and that the defects of the following pages may not be thought sufficient to prevent what measure of truth they may contain, from being perceived and appreciated.MONTREAL, 1833.
POSTSCRIPT.
In the preceding pages, the reader has an explanation of the original design of the work which I venture to place before him; but, in preparing it for publication in this country, I have made some alterations in it, the nature of which it is proper I should here state.
The doctrines which Adam Smith maintained with so much ability, never took so deep hold in this country as in England, and they have been more strongly opposed.There is, hence, a very considerable difference between the state of public sentiment in Great Britain and America, concerning the most interesting practical questions of political economy.This is especially the case with regard to the policy of the protective system.
The practical bearings of that system on the condition of things in this republic, have been discussed so often, and with so much ability, that probably few new arguments or facts concerning it can be brought forward by any one, least of all can they be expected from a foreigner.Although, therefore, I look on the effects of the policy pursued by the legislature of the United States, as affording the best practical illustration hitherto existing of the correctness of some of the principles I maintain, I have scarcely at all referred to them for that purpose, but have contented myself with showing how the benefits resulting from the operations of the legislature, in this and in other similar cases, are to be accounted for.I have thus omitted much matter that would have appeared, had the work been published in England, but which, it seemed to me, would be at least superfluous here.
These omissions occur in the third book, which is consequently much abridged.
To the second book I have made some additions, having given fuller development to the principles there explained, and traced their connexion with events at greater length, than is necessary for the mere purpose of exposing the fallacies of the theoretical views, the refutation of which was originally my sole design.As the additions were made in the progress of the work through the press, in one or two instances I have been led to refer to subjects to be afterwards treated of, which I found it impossible to comprise within such limits as would admit of their insertion.These omissions, however, do not occasion any break in the chain of reasoning.There are, also, some topics, which, though I have introduced, I have but partially discussed, and merely so far as may serve to show some of their connexions with principles expounded.The most important of these is the subject of banking.
Boston, 1834.