It follows,in the next place,that Mill's argument is substantially an interpretation of facts,a sketch of a scientific theory of certain social phenomena.We find that certain rules of conduct are as a matter of fact generally approved;and we have to show that those rules are deducible from the assumed criterion.The rule,'act for the greatest happiness of the greatest number,'coincides with the conduct approved in the recognised morality,and we need and can ask for no further explanation of the 'criterion.'Mill answers the usual objections.The criterion,it is said,can only justify the 'expedient'not the 'right.'The Utilitarian must act from a calculation of 'consequences,'and consequences are so uncertain that no general rule can be framed.To this,as urged by Whewell,Mill replied that his adversary had proved too much.(71)The argument would destroy 'prudence'as well as morality.We can make general rules about the interests of the greatest number as easily as about our own personal interests.And,if it be urged that such general rules always admit of exceptions,all moralists have had to admit exceptions to moral rules.Exceptions,however,as James Mill had said,can only be admitted in morality,when the exception itself expresses a general rule.All moralists admit of lying in some extreme cases,but only where the obligation to speak truth conflicts with some higher obligation.
If something be wanting in this defence,it may perhaps be supplied from Mill himself.The importance of cultivating a sensitive love of truth is,he says,so great as to possess a 'transcendent expediency'(72)not to be violated by temporary considerations.When discussing the question of justice Mill insists upon the importance of the confidence in our fellow-creatures as corresponding to the 'very groundwork of our existence.'The general rule,that is,corresponds to an individual quality which is essential to the social union.Astrong sense of veracity is unconditionally good,though circumstances may require exceptions to any rule when stated in terms of outward conduct.Lying may be necessary,but should always be painful.This is familiar ground on which it is needless to dwell.But another criticism of the 'criterion'is more important and leads to one of Mill's most characteristic arguments.The greatest happiness criterion,it is often said,will be interpreted differently as men form different judgments of what constitutes happiness.The 'felicific calculus'will give different results for the philosopher and the clown,the sensualist and the ascetic,the savage and the civilised man;and it is part of the empiricist contention that in fact the standard has varied widely.Mill himself observes,and he is only following Locke (73)and Hume,'that morality has varied widely;has in some cases sanctioned practices the most revolting'to others,and that the 'universal will of mankind is universal only in its discordance.'(74)It is indeed precisely for that reason that the Utilitarian has defined to accept the authority of the 'moral sense'and appealed to facts.The belief that our feeling is right,simply because it is ours,is the 'mental infirmity which Bentham's philosophy tends to correct and Dr Whewell's to perpetuate.'(75)That is to say,Bentham can lay down an 'objective criterion'because he calculates actual pains and pleasures.But will not this criterion be after all 'subjective'because our estimate of pains and pleasures is so discordant?
