You have certainly made one further reflection,of an advantage which France has,over and above its abilities in the cabinet and the skill of its negotiators,which is (if I may use the expression)its SOLENESS,continuity of riches and power within itself,and the nature of its government.Near twenty millions of people,and the ordinary revenue of above thirteen millions sterling a year,are at the absolute disposal of the Crown.This is what no other power in Europe can say;so that different powers must now unite to make a balance against France;which union,though formed upon the principle of their common interest,can never be so intimate as to compose a machine so compact and simple as that of one great kingdom,directed by one will,and moved by one interest.The Allied Powers (as we have constantly seen)have,besides the common and declared object of their alliance,some separate and concealed view to which they often sacrifice the general one;which makes them,either directly or indirectly,pull different ways.Thus,the design upon Toulon failed in the year 1706,only from the secret view of the House of Austria upon Naples:which made the Court of Vienna,notwithstanding the representations of the other allies to the contrary,send to Naples the 12,000men that would have done the business at Toulon.In this last war too,the same causes had the same effects:the Queen of Hungary in secret thought of nothing but recovering of Silesia,and what she had lost in Italy;and,therefore,never sent half that quota which she promised,and we paid for,into Flanders;but left that country to the maritime powers to defend as they could.The King of Sardinia's real object was Savona and all the Riviera di Ponente;for which reason he concurred so lamely in the invasion of Provence,where the Queen of Hungary,likewise,did not send one-third of the force stipulated,engrossed as she was by her oblique views upon the plunder of Genoa,and the recovery of Naples.Insomuch that the expedition into Provence,which would have distressed France to the greatest degree,and have caused a great detachment from their army in Flanders,failed shamefully,for want of every one thing necessary for its success.
Suppose,therefore,any four or five powers who,all together,shall be equal,or even a little superior,in riches and strength to that one power against which they are united;the advantage will still be greatly on the side of that single power,because it is but one.The power and riches of Charles V.were,in themselves,certainly superior to those of Frances I.,and yet,upon the whole,he was not an overmatch for him.
Charles V.'s dominions,great as they were,were scattered and remote from each other;their constitutions different;wherever he did not reside,disturbances arose;whereas the compactness of France made up the difference in the strength.This obvious reflection convinced me of the absurdity of the treaty of Hanover,in 1725,between France and England,to which the Dutch afterward acceded;for it was made upon the apprehensions,either real or pretended,that the marriage of Don Carlos with the eldest archduchess,now Queen of Hungary,was settled in the treaty of Vienna,of the same year,between Spain and the late Emperor Charles VI.,which marriage,those consummate politicians said would revive in Europe the exorbitant power of Charles V.I am sure,Iheartily wish it had;as,in that case,there had been,what there certainly is not now,one power in Europe to counterbalance that of France;and then the maritime powers would,in reality,have held the balance of Europe in their hands.Even supposing that the Austrian power would then have been an overmatch for that of France (which,by the way,is not clear),the weight of the maritime powers,then thrown into the scale of France,would infallibly have made the balance at least even.
In which case too,the moderate efforts of the maritime powers on the side of France would have been sufficient;whereas now,they are obliged to exhaust and beggar themselves;and that too ineffectually,in hopes to support the shattered;beggared,and insufficient House of Austria.
This has been a long political dissertation;but I am informed that political subjects are your favorite ones;which I am glad of,considering your destination.You do well to get your materials all ready,before you begin your work.As you buy and (I am told)read books of this kind,I will point out two or three for your purchase and perusal;I am not sure that I have not mentioned them before,but that is no matter,if you have not got them.'Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire du 17ieme Siecle',is a most useful book for you to recur to for all the facts and chronology of that country :it is in four volumes octavo,and very correct and exact.If I do not mistake,I have formerly recommended to you,'Les Memoires du Cardinal de Retz';however,if you have not yet read them,pray do,and with the attention which they deserve.You will there find the best account of a very interesting period of the minority of Lewis XIV.The characters are drawn short,but in a strong and masterly manner;and the political reflections are the only just and practical ones that I ever saw in print:they are well worth your transcribing.'Le Commerce des Anciens,par Monsieur Huet.Eveque d'Avranche',in one little volume octavo,is worth your perusal,as commerce is a very considerable part of political knowledge.I need not,I am sure,suggest to you,when you read the course of commerce,either of the ancients or of the moderns,to follow it upon your map;for there is no other way of remembering geography correctly,but by looking perpetually in the map for the places one reads of,even though one knows before,pretty near,where they are.
Adieu!As all the accounts which I receive of you grow better and better,so I grow more and more affectionately,Yours.
