That France cannot by reason of natural, and perpetual Impediments, be more powerful at Sea, than the English, or Hollanders now are, or may be.
POwer at Sea consists chiefly of Men, able to fight at Sea, and that in such Shipping, as is most proper for the Seas wherein they serve; and those are in these Northern Seas, Ships from between three hundred to one thousand three hundred Tuns; and of those such as draw much Water, and have a deep Latch in the Sea, in order to keep a good Wind, and not to fall to Leeward, a matter of vast advantage in Sea Service: Wherefore it is to be examined, 1. Whether the King of France, hath Ports in the Northern Seas (where he hath most occasion for his Fleets of War, in any contests with England) able to receive the Vessels above-mentioned, in all Weathers, both in Winter and Summer Season. For if the King of France, would bring to Sea an equal number of fighting Men, with the English and Hollanders, in small floaty Leeward Vessels, he would certainly be of the weaker side. For a Vessel of one thousand Tuns manned with five hundred Men, fighting with five Vessels of two hundred Tuns, each manned with one hundred Men apiece, shall in common reason have the better offensively, and defensively; forasmuch as the great Ship can carry such Ordnance, as can reach the small ones at a far greater distance, than those can reach, or at least hurt the other; and can batter, and sink at a distance, when small ones can scarce peirce.
Moreover it is more difficult for Men out of a small Vessel, to enter a tall Ship, than for Men from a higher place, to leap down into a lower; nor is small shot so effectual upon a tall Ship, as vice versa .
And as for Vessels drawing much water, and consequently keeping a good Wind, they can take or leave Leeward Vessels, at pleasure, and secure themselves from being boarded by them: Moreover the windward Ship, has a fairer mark at a Leeward Ship, than vice versa; and can place her shot upon such parts of the Leeward Vessel, as upon the next Tack will be under water.
Now then the King of France, having no Ports able to receive large windward Vessels, between Dunkirk and Ushant, what other Ships he can bring into those Seas, will not be considerable. As for the wide Ocean, which his Harbours of Brest, and Charente, do look into; it affordeth him no advantage upon an Enemy; there being so great a Latitude of engaging or not, even when the Parties are in sight of each other.
Wherefore, although the King of France were immensely rich, and could build what Ships he pleased, both for number, and quality; yet if he have not Ports to receive, and shelter, that sort and size of Shipping, which is fit for his purpose; the said Riches will in this case be fruitless, and a mere expence without any return, or profit. Some will say that other Nations cannot build so good Ships as the English;
I do indeed hope they cannot; but because it seems too possible, that they may sooner or later, by Practice and Experience; I shall not make use of that Argument, having bound my self to shew, that the impediments of France, (as to this purpose) are natural, and perpetual. Ships, and Guns do not fight of themselves, but Men who act and manage them; wherefore it is more material to shew; That the King of France, neither hath, nor can have Men sufficient, to Man a Fleet, of equal strength to that of the King of England. (viz.)
The King of Englands Navy, consists of about seventy thousand Tuns of Shipping, which requires thirty six thousand Men to Man it; these Men being supposed to be divided into eight parts, I conceive that one eighth part, must be persons of great Experience, and Reputation, in Sea Service: another eighth part must be such as have used the Sea seven years I and upwards; half of them, or parts more, must be such as have used the Sea above a twelvemonth, viz, two, three, four, five, or six years, allowing but one quarter of the whole Complements, to be such as never were at Sea at all, or at most but one Voyage, or upon one Expedition; so that at a medium I reckon, that the whole Fleet must be Men of three or four years growth, one with another. Fournier, a late judicious Writer, makeing it his business to persuade the World, how considerable the King of France was, or might be at Sea, in the ninety second and ninety third pages of his Hydrography, saith, That there was one place in Britany, which had furnished the King with one thousand four hundred Seamen, and that perhaps the whole Sea-Coast of France, might have furnished him with fifteen times as many: Now supposing his whole Allegation were true, yet the said number amounts but to twenty one thousand; all which, if the whole Trade of Shipping in France were quite and clean abandoned, would not by above a third, Man out a Fleet equivalent, to that of the King of England: And if the Trade were but barely kept alive, there would not be one third part Men enough, to Man the said Fleet.
But if the Shipping Trade of France, be not above a quarter as great as that of England, and that one third part of the same, namely the Fishing Trade to the Banks of Newfoundland, is not peculiar, nor fixt to the French; then I say that if the King of England (having power to Press Men) cannot under two or three months time Man his Fleet; then the King of France, with less than a quarter of the same help, can never do it at all; for in France (as shall elsewhere be shewn) there are not above one hundred and fifty thousand Tun of Trading Vessels, and consequently not above fifteen thousand Seamen, reckoning a Man to every ten Tun. As it has been shewn that the King of France, cannot at present Man such a Fleet, as is above described, we come next to shew that he never can, being under natural, and perpetual Impediments: viz. 1. If there be but fifteen thousand Sea- men in all France, to manage its Trade, it is not to be supposed, that the said Trade should be extinguished, nor that it should spare above five of the said fifteen thousand towards manning the Fleet which requires thirty five thousand.
