On the same If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the will, and the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about which we have been busied are in no man's power: and the things which are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have we still?
"But give me directions." Why should I give you directions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what is your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things from you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But how do you act? when you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others besides? "Well, but he has not given these orders" you will say. Produce your precognitions, produce the proofs of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you have meditated on (and you will then see that all these things are from God). How long, then, is it fit to observe these precepts from God, and not to break up the play? As long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Saturnalia a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom to play at this game. The king commands: "Do you drink," "Do you mix the wine," "Do you sing," "Do you go," "Do you come." I obey that the game may be broken up through me.
But if he says, "Think that you are in evil plight": I answer, "I do not think so"; and who compel me to think so? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, "Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis." I go. He says, "Come," and I come.
For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, so ought we to do in life. "Suppose it to be night." I suppose that it is night. "Well then; is it day?" No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. "Suppose that you think that it is night?" Suppose that I do. "But also think that it is night." That is not consistent with the hypothesis. So in this case also: "Suppose that you are unfortunate." Well, suppose so. "Are you then unhappy?" Yes. "Well, then, are you troubled with an unfavourable demon?"
Yes. "But think also that you are in misery." This is not consistent with the hypothesis; and Another forbids me to think so.
