Or averse to the constitution,because they are so to the government,which I think may be the case of more.Both of these tend to the same point.One would subvert the government,that they might change the constitution.The other would sacrifice the constitution,that they might subvert the government.
A third possible division,and I seek no more,is that of men attached to the government;or,to speak more properly,to the persons of those who govern;or,to speak more properly still,to the power,profit,or protection they acquire by the favour of these persons,but enemies to the constitution.
Now,as to the first and second of these possible divisions,if there be any such among us,I do not apprehend that we are at present,or can be hereafter in much danger,or that the cause of liberty can meet with much opposition from them;though the second have certainly views more likely to bring slavery upon us,than to promote liberty.and though prudence requires that we should be on our guard against both.The first,indeed,might hope to unite even the bulk of the nation to them,in a weak and oppressive reign.
If grievances should grow intolerable under some prince as yet unborn;if redress should become absolutely desperate;if liberty itself should be in imminent peril;the nature of our constitution would justify the resistance,that we ought to believe well enough of posterity to persuade ourselves would be made in such an exigency.But without such an exigency,particular men would flatter themselves extremely,if they hoped to make the nation angry because they were so.Private motives can never influence numbers.When a nation revolts,the injury is national.This case therefore is remote,improbable,nay,impossible,under the lenity,justice and heroical spirit of the present government;and if I mentioned such an imaginary party,it was only done that I might omit none which can be supposed.The projects of the second division,stated in the same hypothetical manner,are surely too extravagant,and their designs too wicked to be dangerous.Disputes may arise hereafter,in some distant time,about ministers,perhaps about Kings;but I persuade myself that this constitution will be,as it ought to be always,distinguished from,and preferred to both,by the British nation.Reasons must arise in process of time,from the very nature of man,to oppose ministers and Kings too;but none can arise,in the nature of things,to oppose such a constitution as ours.Better ministers,better Kings,may be hereafter often wanted,and sometimes found,but a better constituted government never can.Should there be therefore still any such men as we here suppose,among us,they cannot expect,if they are in their senses,a national concurrence,and surely a little reJection will serve to show them,that the same reasons which make them weaker now than they were some years ago,must make them weaker some years hence than they are now.
As to the third division,if any such there be,it is in that our greatest and almost our whole danger centres.The others cannot overthrow,but these may undermine our liberty.Capable of being admitted into power in all courts,and more likely than other men to be so in every court except the present,whose approved penetration and spotless innocence give a certain exclusion to them,they may prevent any further securities from being procured to liberty,till those already established are dissolved or perverted.Since then our principal danger must in all times arise from those who belong to this division,it is necessary to show,before we conclude these discourses,by what means such men may carry on their pernicious designs with effect,and by what means they may be defeated.These considerations will lead us to fix that point,wherein men of all denominations ought to unite,and do unite,and to state the sole distinction of parties,which can be made with truth at this time amongst us.
I am,sir,etc.
