If all this be as clear as I imagine it is;if the objections to frequent elections of Parliaments do not lie;or,supposing them to lie,if the danger on one side outweighs vastly the supposed inconveniency on the other;nay,if laws and institutions,not more essential to the preservation of liberty than this ancient and fundamental rule of our constitution,be maintained;and if all men are forced to agree,even they,who wish them perhaps abolished,that they ought to be maintained,for the sake of preserving liberty;let me ask again,how comes it to pass,that we observe so great a difference between the sentiments and reasonings of mankind about frequent sessions of Parliament,and frequent Parliaments;about the case now before us,and all the others that have been mentioned?The only manner,in which I can account for such an inconsistency,is this.The sight of the mind differs very much from the sight of the body,and its operations are frequently the reverse of the other.Objects at a distance appear to the former in their true magnitude,and diminish as they are brought nearer.The event,that created much astonishment,indignation,or terror in prospect,creates less and less as it approaches,and by the time it happens,men have familiarized themselves with it.--If the Romans had been told,in the days of Augustus,that an emperor would succeed,in whose reign an horse should be made consul,they would have been extremely surprised.I believe they were not so much surprised when the thing happened,when the horse was consul and Caligula emperor.--If it had been foretold to those patriots at the Revolution,who remembered long Parliaments,who still felt the smart of them,who struggled hard for annual,and obtained with much difficulty,at the end of five or six years,triennial Parliaments,that a time would come,when even the term of triennial Parliaments would be deemed too short,and a parliament chosen for three years,would choose itself for four more,and entail septennial Parliaments on the nation;that this would happen,and the fruits of their honest labours be lost,in little more than twenty years;and that it would be brought about,whilst our government continued on the foundations they had then so newly laid:if all this had been foretold at the time I mention,it would have appeared improbable and monstrous to the friends of the Revolution.
Yet it hath happened;and in less than twenty years,it is grown,or is growing,familiar to us.The uniform zeal and complaisance of our Parliaments for the crown,leave little room to apprehend any attempt to govern without them,or to make them do in one session the work of seven;though this would be extremely convenient,no doubt,a great case to future ministers,and a great saving of expense and time to country gentlemen.But suppose,for I desire it may be remembered that we reason hypothetically,suppose a Parliament should think fit to give,in the first session,all the money,all the credit,and all the powers necessary for carrying on the government,during seven years;and then let those persons,who will be shocked at this supposition,and vet declare themselves for septennial parliaments,lay their hands on their hearts,and consider whether such an alteration of the constitution might not grow familiar to them,and even gain their approbation.I think it would do so.I am sure it might as reasonably as the other.They would find the case,in one case,of little attendance,as much as that of distant elections in the other.The arguments of conveniency,expediency,public tranquillity,and strength to the government,would be just as well applied;and if the ministers should,by miracle,make no very exorbitant ill use of such a situation,I doubt whether he who should plead for annual parliaments then,would be much better heard by the same persons,than he who pleads for frequent elections of Parliaments is now.But let not the lovers of liberty,the friends of our constitution,reason in this manner.Let them remember that danger commences when the breach is made,not when the attack is begun;that he who neglects to stop the leak as soon as it is discovered,in hopes to save his ship by pumping,when the water gushes in with violence,deserves to be drowned;and,to lay aside figures of speech,that our constitution is not,like the schemes of some politicians,a jumble of disjointed,incoherent whimsies,but a noble and wise system,the essential parts of which are so proportioned,and so intimately connected,that a change in one begets a change in the whole;that the frequent elections of Parliament are as much an essential part of this system,as the frequent sittings of Parliament;that the work of the Revolution is imperfect therefore,and our future security precarious,unless our ancient constitution be restored,in this essential part;and that the restoration of it,in this part,is one of those methods,by which alone the pernicious designs of such men as we have mentioned in a former letter,if any such should be ever admitted into power (enemies to the constitution,under the mask of zeal for the government)may be defeated.
I am,sir,etc.
