By simple forms of government,I mean such as lodge the whole supreme power,absolutely and without control,either in a single person,or in the principal persons of the community,or in the whole body of the people.Such governments are governments of arbitrary will,and therefore of all imaginable absurdities the most absurd.They stand in direct opposition to the sole motive of submission to any government whatsoever;for if men quit the state,and renounce the rights of nature (one of which is,to be sure,that of being governed by their own will),they do this,that they may not remain exposed to the arbitrary will of other men,the weakest to that of the strongest,the few to that of the many.Now,in submitting to any simple form of government whatever,they establish what they mean to avoid,and for fear of being exposed to arbitrary will sometimes,they choose to be governed by it always.These governments do not only degenerate into tyranny,they are tyranny in their very institution;and they who submit to them are slaves,not subjects,however the supreme power may be exercised:for tyranny and slavery do not so properly consist in the stripes that are given and received,as in the power of giving them at pleasure,and the necessity of receiving them,whenever and for whatever they are inflicted.Absolute democracy may appear to some,in abstracted speculation,a less deviation from nature than monarchy,and more agreeable to reason,because here it is the will of the whole community,that governs the whole community,and because reason does certainly instruct every man,even from a consciousness of his own frailty,the impotentia animi of the Latin writers,to trust as little power as possible to any other man.But still it must be confessed,that if it be unsafe for a people to trust too much power to a prince,it is unsafe for them likewise to keep too much power to themselves.Absolute monarchy is tyranny;but absolute democracy is tyranny and anarchy both.If aristocracy be placed between these two extremes,it is placed on a slippery ridge,and must fall into one or the other,according to the natural course of human affairs;if the few who govern are united,into tyranny,perhaps,more severe than any other;if they are disunited,into factions and disorders as great as those of the most tumultuous democracy.
From such observations,and many of the same kind and tendency,it hath been concluded very reasonably,that the best form of government must be one compounded of these three,and in which they are all so tempered,that each may produce the good effects,and be restrained by the counterworkings of the other two,from producing the bad effects that are natural to it.
Thus much is evident.But then how to fix that just proportion of each,how to hit that happy temperament of them all in one system,is a difficulty that hath perplexed the wisest politicians,and the most famous legislators.
Let me quote one of the greatest writers of antiquity.Tacitus acknowledges,in the fourth book of his Annals,what is here advanced;but he thinks such a constitution of government rather a subject of fine speculation than of practice.He thinks it much more likely that such a system should continue to be admired and praised in idea,than established in fact;and if it happens ever to be established,he does not imagine it can be supported long.Not only the real difficulties which his sagacity presented to his mind,but his reflections on the constitution and fate of the Roman commonwealth might lead Tacitus into this despondency.But what the refinements of Roman policy could not do,hath been done in this island,upon foundations laid by the rough simplicity of our northern ancestors.
It would be a curious and entertaining amusement,to reduce the constitutions of the Roman government,and of those which were formed on the ruins of that empire,particularly of our own,to their first principles;to observe in which they agree,and in which they differ,and the uniform or various tendencies of each;to mark the latent,as well as apparent causes of their rise and fall;how well or how ill they were contrived for triumphs abroad,or peace at home;for vain grandeur,or real prosperity.for resisting corruption,or being ruined by it.Such an analysis and enquiry would be,I imagine,not only amusing but useful.At least,it would be more so than any rhapsody of general reflections,huddled together with little order or designs;for these leave no systematical impressions on the mind;nothing but a confusion of ideas,often bright and glittering,seldom instructive.But a work of this kind would be too voluminous and too aspiring for these little essays,and the humble author of them.He will therefore keep to his point,and content himself to make some of those observations alone,which seem proper to illustrate and prove what he hath advanced,that the British constitution is a plain and sufficient rule of judgment and conduct to us in everything that regards our liberty;for preserving of which,as well as for securing its own duration,it is better fitted than any other.
