This precedent having been made in favour of one king,and in one particular conjuncture,it became a prevailing argument in favour of every other king,and in every other conjuncture:for though it may be,nay must be,in the vast variety of characters,and of conjunctures,prudent and just to grant in favour of some princes,and upon some occasions,what it would be neither prudent nor just to grant in favour of other princes,and upon other occasions,yet such is the merit of every prince who fills a throne,or rather such is the servile adulation paid to power,in what hands soever it be lodged,that general and almost universal experience shows this rule,which no man of sense would break in the management of his private interests,absolutely reversed in the management of the most important,national interests.The inference to be drawn from hence is plainly this,that the inconveniency or danger of refusing to every prince,and in every conjuncture,such things as are inconsistent with the constitution of a free government,must be always less than the inconveniency or danger of granting them to any prince,and in any conjuncture.
Let me add this farther observation,which presents itself so naturally after the former.Though it be proper in all limited monarchies to watch and guard against all concessions,or usurpations,that may destroy the balance of power,on which the preservation of liberty depends;yet is it certain that concessions to the crown from the other constituent parts of the legislature are almost alone to be feared.There is no danger that the crown should make them to the others;and on this head the people may very safely trust to those who wear it,and those who serve it.The nobility will not make them to the commons,without great struggles,which give time for interpositions,nor the commons to the nobility.But both may be easily induced to make them to the crown.The reasons of this difference are obvious enough;for,first,a king is really nothing more than a supreme magistrate,instituted for the service of the community,which requires that the executive power should be vested in a single person.He hath,indeed,a crown on his head,a sceptre in his hand,and velvet robes on his back,and he sits elevated in a throne,whilst others stand on the ground about him;and all this to denote that he is a king,and to draw the attention and reverence of the vulgar.Just so another man wears a mitre on his head,a crosier in his hand,and lawn sleeves,and sits in a purple elbow-chair,to denote that he is a bishop,and to excite the devotion of the multitude,who receive his benediction very thankfully on their knees.But still the king,as well as the bishop,holds an office,and owes a service.Officium est imperare,non regnum.The King,when he commands,discharges a trust,and performs a duty,as well as the subject,when he obeys.Notwithstanding which,kings are apt to see themselves in another light,and experience shows us that even they who made them what they are,are apt to take them for what they are not.From hence it happened in Spain,and may happen possibly in other countries,that the kings,instead of being satisfied with and thankful for the dignity,honour,power and wealth,which they possessed in so eminent a degree above all other magistrates and members of the commonwealth,repined at their being possessed of no more.What they had was given them by the constitution;and what they had not was reserved by the same authority to the nobility and to the commons.
But they proceeded,and their sycophants reasoned,as if the sole power of the government,and the whole wealth of the nation,belonged of right to them,and the limitations of the monarchy were so many usurpations on the monarch.--In the second place,besides this constant desire of encroaching,there is another reason why concessions to the crown are more to be guarded against than others,in limited monarchies.The regal power resides in one person.The other shares of the supreme power are assigned to bodies of men.
From hence it follows that the interest of the king,and the interest of the crown,cannot well be divided in the mind of a prince;whereas the interest of each individual may be distinguished from the interest of the nobility or of the commons,and still more from that of the nation,in the minds of those who compose an house of peers,or who are representatives of the people.
