These assemblies of the three estates,the nobility,clergy and commons,were invented first by Philip le Bel.They were entirely unknown before the year 1301.The people had no right to any such assemblies;and when they were instituted,they were plainly designed for nothing less than the good of the people.Long after the establishment of the Capetian race,when taxes grew heavy,and were laid on and levied very arbitrarily,seditions and rebellions of an oppressed people,who had no other recourse,followed.To prevent these,not only writs,or orders,were sent to the nobility and clergy,in the several sheriffwicks and bailiwicks,but to the commons,to assemble and take into consideration how to redress grievances,and support the public expenses;and after such consideration had amongst themselves,to depute some persons of each order,or estate,to confer together in the place appointed for holding such general assemblies.The commons were added to these assemblies,'says Pasquier,'against the ancient order or practice of France,for no other reason than this,that the principal burden,or charge,was to fall upon them.'This was the true reason.Redress of grievances had no part in the schemes of that rapacious and profuse prince,who was the author of this institution;and he that considers the manner in which these assemblies were convened,the powers they were suffered to exercise,the subordination in which the commons particularly were kept,and the habitual,unavoidable influence under which they lay,will be easily convinced that such assemblies were fitted to do the jobs and sanctify the iniquity of the court,and nothing more.If at any time they make any good ordinances for the reformation of the state,'these ordinances are',says honest Pasquier,'like fine pieces of tapestry,hung up to make a show to posterity'.They have no other effect.
'But the imposition granted to the king hath its full effect.'I conclude therefore,and upon sufficient grounds,that even since the establishment of these assemblies of the estates,in the beginning of the fourteenth century,the people of France have had no real share in the supreme power of the government,either collectively or representatively.
I might illustrate and prove what is here advanced,by the example of every assembly of the states of France,of which we have any good accounts,from the first in 1301to the last that was held,as I remember,in 1614.
But such a deduction would carry us too far.I shall content myself therefore with making two observations.
First,that these farces,for such these assemblies were,and such they were designed to be,owe their institution not only to one of the worst kings,but to one of the worst ministers that France ever saw,Enguerand de Marigny,who was called the coadjutor and the governor of the kingdom;the most insolent,the most avaricious,and the most prodigal man of his age.The great ability of this minister,on which his whole merit with a greedy master was raised,consisted in making his administration a system of violence and fraud,in order to plunder and enslave the people.When he durst not employ one,he turned himself to the other;and how grossly and impudently he managed even fraud,it may not be improper to take notice,in one instance,because we shall see the better,by this instance,what the nature and effect of these assemblies were,of which we speak,and what use the court made of them from their first institution.Enguerand de Marigny then meeting with great opposition to some taxes he had devised,proposed the calling an assembly of the states,and hoped probably that he might gain the commons to favour the intention he had of extending these taxes to the nobility and clergy.A great scaffold was erected.The King,the lords and the clergy took their places on it.
The commons attended at the foot of it.The minister made a most vehement declamation,to stir the passions of the audience,and made no scruple of insinuating in it,what neither he nor his master intended to perform a promise of reimbursing,after the expedition proposed,what the people should give to the King.The King rose from his throne,and advanced to the extremity of the scaffold,that he might second by his looks the harangue of his treasurer,and see who those were that refused,or consented to the aid he demanded.
The deputies of Paris promised to give a sufficient supply,or to follow the King in their persons to the war.The other deputies concurred in this great engagement,and the assembly broke up,without any farther deliberation,or any ordinance of the estates.But an ordinance of the King soon followed;a general excise was imposed by his authority,as if it had been the grant of the estates to him;and his minister had a number of harpies ready,whom he let loose to desolate the kingdom,by levying this infamous tax,for the consideration of some little advance made to the King.If you ask what were the consequences of these proceedings,it will be sufficient to mention two.
The tax of a fifth on the revenues of the subject,which is the proportion of our land-tax of four shillings in the pound,was continued,though the general excise had been imposed;and Enguerand de Marigny was hanged in the succeeding reign for this amongst other crimes,though not by an assembly of the estates;for the estates had neither the opportunity nor the power of resenting the greatest insult that could be offered them,and the greatest injury that could be done to the nation.
The next observation I have to make is very short,but I think very pertinent,and very important.--This example shows us clearly how true it is,that no instruments of tyranny can be found so sure and effectual as an assembly of the estates of a realm,when such an assembly is so constituted as to want the power,which was from the first the case of the three estates in France,and the same must happen when they are so managed as to want the will,which became at last the case of the Cortes in Spain,to secure the liberty and defend the property of the people,against such kings as Philip le Bel,and such coadjutors as Marigny.This prince and his minister has strained prerogative to the utmost,and had governed by it very tyrannically.
Whilst this expedient would do,they tried no other;but when they apprehended it might fail them,they added a deputation of the commons to the assembly of the estates;that,seeming to create a new control on the crown,they might in reality give greater scope and freer exercise to arbitrary will.
The friends of liberty therefore,who live under limited monarchies,cannot be too careful to preserve their constitution in vigour,nor too fearful lest their representatives should be so influenced as to neglect their privileges,misapply their powers,and depart from their integrity;since these friends of liberty see that the greatest masters of tyranny have judged the form,without the spirit,of a free government more favourable to their schemes of oppression,than all the authority that absolute monarchy can give;and that they made an innovation in the form of their government on this very motive,and for this very purpose.
I am,sir,etc.
