Let us leave the dispute to the partisans of Joseph Scaliger and Petavius,of father Simon and Le Clerc.Thus much is certain.A great sanhedrin subsisted at Jerusalem,even at the coming of the Messiah,as well as inferior sanhedrins in several parts of Palestine;which form of government bore some resemblance to our old Saxon constitution;and he who takes the trouble of looking into Mr Selden,will find that the great sanhedrin had as much authority,and exercised as much power,as ever Parliaments did,or witanegemots could claim.
That God approved a kind of parliamentary establishment,and a division of the supreme power between his vicegerent Moses and the seventy elders,to whom he gave some of the spirit that was on Moses,the quotations I refer to from holy writ do sufficiently prove.After this,it cannot be said,Ithink,to derogate from the majesty of any prince,let us entertain as high notions of this majesty as we please,that he is relieved from the burden of governing alone;that he is obliged to share the supreme power with the nobility and commonalty of the realm;and that he is hindered from destroying,either directly or indirectly,that independency of those other estates,which can alone preserve,this division of the supreme power,really,as well as apparently.But perhaps these great and honest men have discovered a necessity of putting the members,or a majority of the members of Parliament,under the influence of the crown,in order to preserve this very constitution.
Let us see therefore what dangers this expedient is fitted to prevent.--Are we afraid that an House of Commons,unless restrained by places and pensions,should give up the constitution to the lords,and establish an aristocracy?
This fear would be ridiculous surely;and he who should argue against such a supposition,would make himself so.--Are we afraid that an House of Commons,unless restrained in this manner,should usurp more power than belongs to them,and establish a kind of democratical tyranny?But they would have,in opposition to them,a power sufficient to defeat their designs:the united power of the crown,and of the House of Lords.Formerly,indeed,they succeeded in an attempt of this kind;and the King and the lords may,at any time,throw too much power into their scale,and set the sense and spirit of the people on their side,as was done at that time.But this neither hath been,nor can be done,unless both King and lords conduct themselves so ill,that the mischiefs to be apprehended from their prevalency appear as great,or greater,than those which are to be apprehended from the prevalency of the commons.Let it be remembered too,that as the King and lords may give too much power and popularity to the commons,so the lords and commons may give too much power to the crown.The difference will lie only here;that the King and lords will never do the first designedly;whereas there is a possibility that the lords and commons may be induced,in some age less virtuous than the present,by places,pensions and other gratifications,bestowed on a majority of those assemblies,to do the last designedly.What now remains to be urged,in favour of this expedient?From what danger are we to be protected by it?Shall we be told that Parliaments will not pursue the national interest,unless their members are bought into it by the crown?
Something like this hath been advanced,I have heard;and nothing more impudent,nor more silly could be advanced.A court that is truly in the interest of the nation,will have,nay,must have a concurrence of Parliament,as it would be easy,if it was needful,to show.Time and trouble,indeed,may be sometimes required to lead independent men,who judge for themselves,and comply because they are convinced;whereas neither one nor the other are wanting,to determine such as hold to a court by a corrupt dependency on it:for they are soon disciplined,and ready to perform the whole exercise of parliamentary mercenaries at the beat of a drum.Some inconveniencies may likewise arise,for that which I have just mentioned does not deserve the name,from the independency of Parliaments.Ministers,for instance,may be called to account by the passion,by the prejudice,if you will,of such assemblies,oftener,perhaps,than they deserve to be;or their errors may be censured,or their faults be punished,in a greater degree,and with more rigour,not only than true political justice requires,which should always be tempered with mercy,but even than strict justice exacts.But as one of these is a fault,if it be a fault,on the best side,and as the other will certainly happen very seldom,it does not seem reasonable,that a door should be opened to corruption and dependency,in order to prevent them.Nay,farther,this vigilance,and this severity of Parliaments,which we here suppose,will not fail to have some very good effects,that are more than sufficient to balance the supposed ill effects.Among the rest,they may render the rash,who are in power,more cautious,and the bold more modest.They may render fools less fond of power,and awe even knaves into honesty.It were better,surely,that able and good men should now and then suffer,nay,the good man who suffered would be himself of this opinion,than that the adulation and servility of Parliaments,which are the necessary consequences of corruption and dependency,should ever contribute to make the court become,in any future age,a sanctuary for pickpockets,and an hospital for changelings.
I am,sir,etc.
