But nothing of this kind was done at the Revolution.Pleased that the open attacks on our constitution were defeated and prevented,men entertained no thought of the secret attacks that might be carried on against the independency of Parliaments;as if our dangers could be but of one kind,and could arise but from one family.Soon after the Revolution,indeed,men of all sides,and of all denominations (for it was not a party-cause,though it was endeavoured to be made such)began to perceive not only that nothing effectual had been done to hinder the undue influence of the crown in elections,and an over balance of the creatures of the court in Parliament,but that the means of exercising such an influence,at the will of the crown,were unawares and insensibly increased,and every day increasing.In a word,they began to see that the foundations were laid of giving as great power to the crown indirectly,as the prerogative,which they had formerly dreaded so much,could give directly,and of establishing universal corruption.The first hath happened,and we pray that the last never may.
The net revenue of the crown,at the abdication of King James,amounted to somewhat more than two millions,without any tax on land,or malt,and without a multitude of grievous impositions and excises,that have been since heaped on the nation.It is plain,and it was so then,that this revenue might have been so increased,as to answer annually the great annual expenses,in which we engaged soon afterwards.In this case,the people would not have had a greater,nay nor so great a burden to bear,as they had in the course of the two wars that followed;and,at the end of these wars,they would have found themselves with little or no load upon them,instead of crouching under a debt of fifty millions.That this method was not taken,furnishes matter of very melancholy reflection to the present,and will do so to future generations.But these reflections are no part of my subject.
How it came to pass that a method so practicable,and so eligible,was not taken (whether this was owing to private interest,to party-cunning of different and opposite kinds,or to an unhappy refinement in politics,that contracting national debts,under a new establishment,was an effectual expedient to attach men to this establishment),I shall not presume to say.All three might have their share,perhaps,in determining for another measure.At least it is a point,on which the men of that time have spoken with much prejudice,and little candour.But however that might be,certain it is that we began to borrow at high interest,to anticipate and mortgage,immediately after the Revolution:and having once begun,there was no remedy;we were forced to proceed in the same manner,through the course of two mighty wars.Formerly,the whole expense of the state was borne by the crown;and when this expense grew,upon extraordinary occasions,too great for the revenue of the crown to bear,the people aided the crown,if they approved the occasions of the expense.These grants were properly aids,no more:for the revenue of the crown was engaged in the first place,and therefore it might seem reasonable that the crown should have the levying and management of the whole;of these aids,as well as of the standing revenue.But it happened in this case,as it does in many.the reason of the thing ceased,and the thing continued.
A separate,private revenue,or a civil list,as we commonly call it,was assigned to the crown.From that time,the former order hath been reversed.
