1.We now come to the last topic touched upon in this digression:a certain `duty',which,according to our Author's account,the supreme power lies under:the duty of making laws.
2.`Thus far',says he,`as to the right of the supreme power to make laws;but farther,it is its duty likewise.For since the respective members are bound to conform themselves to the will of the state,it is expedient that they receive directions from the state declaratory of that its will.
But since it is impossible,in so great a multitude,to give injunctions to every particular man,relative to each particular action,therefore the state establishes general rules for the perpetual infor mation and direction of all persons,in all points,whether of positive or negative duty.And this,in order that every man may know what to look upon as his own,what as another's;what absolute and what relative duties are required at his hands;what is to be esteemed honest,dishonest,or indifferent;what degree every man retains of his natural liberty;what he has given up as the price of the benefits of society;and after what manner each person is to moderate the use and exercise of those rights which the state assigns him,in order to promote and secure the public tranquillity.'
3.Still as obscure,still as ambiguous as ever.The `supreme power'
we may remember,according to the definition so lately given of it by our Author,and so often spoken of,is neither more nor less than the power to make laws.Of this power we are now told that it is its `duty `to make laws.Hence we learnwhat?that it is its `duty'to do what it does;to be,in short,what it is.This then is what the paragraph now before us,with its apparatus of `fors',and `buts',and `sinces',is designed to prove to us.Of this stamp is that meaning,at least,of the initial sentence,which is apparent upon the face of it.
4.Compleat the sense of the phrase,`to make laws';add to it,in this place,what it wants in order to be an adequate expression of the import which the preceding paragraph seemed to annex to it;you have now,for what is mentioned as the object of the `duty',another sense indeed,but a sense still more untenable than the foregoing.`Thus far',says our Author (recapitulating what he had been saying before)`as to the right of the supreme power to make laws.'By this `right'we saw,in the preceding chapter,was meant,a right to make laws in all cases whatsoever.`But further',he now adds,`it is its duty likewise.'Its duty then to dowhat?to do the same thing that it was before asserted to be its right to doto make laws in all cases whatsoever:or (to use another word,and that our Author's own,and that applied to the same purpose)that it is its duty to be 'absolute.'(95)A sort of duty this which will probably be thought rather a singular one.
5.Mean time the observation which,if I conjecture right,he really had in view to make,is one which seems very just indeed,and of no mean importance,but which is very obscurely expressed,and not very obviously connected with the purpose of what goes before.The duty he here means is a duty,which respects,I take it,not so much the actual making of laws,as the taking of proper measures to spread abroad the knowledge of whatever laws happen to have been made:a duty which (to adopt some of our Author's own words)is conversant,not so much about issuing `directions',as about providing that such as are issued shall be `received'.
6.Mean time to speak of the duties of a supreme power;of a legislature,meaning a supreme legislature;of a set of men acknow ledged to be absolute;is what,I must own,I am not very fond of.Not that I would wish the subordinate part of the community to be a whit less watchful over their governors,or more disposed to unlimited submission in point of conduct,than if Iwere to talk with ever so much peremptoriness of the `duties'of these latter,and of the rights which the former have against them:(96)what I am afraid of is,running into solecism and confusion in discourse.
7.I understand,I think,pretty well,what is meant by the word duty m (political duty)when applied to myself;and I could not persuade of myself,I think,to apply it in the same sense in a regular didactic discourse to those whom I am speaking of as my supreme governors.That is my duty to do,which I am liable to be punished,according to law,if I do not do:this is the original,ordinary,and proper sense of the word duly.(97)Have these supreme governors any such duty?No:for if they are at all liable to punishment according to law,whether it be for not doing any thing,or for doing,then are they not,what they are supposed to be,supreme governors:(98)those are the supreme governors,by whose appointment the former are liable to be punished.
8.The word duty,then,if applied to persons spoken of as supreme governors,is evidently applied to them in a sense which is figurative and improper:
nor therefore are the same conclusions to be drawn from any propositions in which it is used in this sense,as might be drawn from them if it were used in the other sense,which is its proper one.
9.This explanation,then,being premised;understanding myself to be using the word duty in its improper sense,the proposition that it is the duty of the legislature to spread abroad,as much as possible,the knowledge of their will among the people,is a proposition I am disposed most unreservedly to accede to.If this be our Author's meaning,I join myself to him heart and voice.
