From the Independent Journal.
Saturday， February 23， 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York：
WE HAVE seen， that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not， without hazard， be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see， what would be the danger on the other side； that is， from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended， that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all would， in this respect at least， be the security of all. But it is alleged， that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others， by confining the places of election to particular districts， and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions， this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand， no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply， could ever find its way into the national councils； and on the other， it may be concluded with certainty， that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them， it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.
The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection， that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people， headed and directed by the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may， in certain turbulent and factious seasons， be violated， in respect to a particular class of citizens， by a victorious and overbearing majority； but that so fundamental a privilege， in a country so situated and enlightened， should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people， by the deliberate policy of the government， without occasioning a popular revolution， is altogether inconceivable and incredible.
In addition to this general reflection， there are considerations of a more precise nature， which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national government， and 誷till more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches， must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property， in the genius， manners， and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union， to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects， yet there are causes， as well physical as moral， which may， in a greater or less degree， permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter， will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people， the Senate by the State legislatures， the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people， there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
As to the Senate， it is impossible that any regulation of "time and manner，" which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body， can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort； a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included？ Or to what purpose would it be established， in reference to one branch of the legislature， if it could not be extended to the other？ The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate， unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter supposition， it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed -- whether in their hands or in those of the Union.
But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils？ Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry， or between the different kinds of property， or between the different degrees of property？ Will it lean in favor of the landed interest， or the moneyed interest， or the mercantile interest， or the manufacturing interest？ Or， to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution， will it court the elevation of "the wealthy and the well-born，" to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society？
If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property， I presume it will readily be admitted， that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm， that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils， than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be， that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter.
