Both Canning and Adams won victories, but neither realized his full hopes.Canning prevented the interference of Europe in Spanish America, broke up the Quadruple Alliance, rendered the Holy Alliance a shadow, and restored a balance of power that meant safety for England for almost a hundred years; but he failed to dictate American policy.Adams on his part detached the United States from European politics without throwing England into the arms of Europe.He took advantage of the divisions of the Old World to establish the priority of the United States in American affairs; but he failed in his later attempt to unite all the Americas in cordial cooperation.Earnest as was his desire and hard as he strove in 1825 when he had become President with Clay as his Secretary of State, Adams found that the differences in point of view between the United States and the other American powers were too great to permit a Pan-American policy.The Panama Congress on which he built his hopes failed, and for fifty years the project lay dormant.
Under the popular name of the Monroe Doctrine, however, Adams's policy has played a much larger part in world affairs than he expected.Without the force of law either in this country or between nations, this doctrine took a firm hold of the American imagination and became a national ideal, while other nations have at least in form taken cognizance of it.The Monroe Doctrine has survived because Adams did not invent its main tenets but found them the dominating principles of American international politics; his work, like that of his contemporary John Marshall, was one of codification.But not all those who have commented on the work of Adams have possessed his analytical mind, and many have confused what was fundamental in his pronouncement with what was temporary and demanded by the emergency of the time.
Always the American people have stood, from the first days of their migration to America, for the right of the people of a territory to determine their own development.First they have insisted that their own right to work out their political destiny be acknowledged and made safe.For this they fought the Revolution.It has followed that they have in foreign affairs tried to keep their hands free from entanglements with other countries and have refrained from interference with foreign politics.This was the burden of Washington's "Farewell Address,"and it was a message which Jefferson reiterated in his inaugural.
These are the permanent principles which have controlled enlightened American statesmen in their attitude toward the world, from the days of John Winthrop to those of Woodrow Wilson.
It was early found, however, that the affairs of the immediate neighbors of the United States continually and from day to day affected the whole texture of American life and that actually they limited American independence and therefore could not be left out of the policy of the Government.The United States soon began to recognize that there was a region in the affairs of which it must take a more active interest.As early as 1780Thomas Pownall, an English colonial official, predicted that the United States must take an active part in Cuban affairs.In 1806Madison, then Secretary of State, had instructed Monroe, Minister to Great Britain, that the Government began to broach the idea that the whole Gulf Stream was within its maritime jurisdiction.
The message of Monroe was an assertion that the fate of both the Americas was of immediate concern to the safety of the United States, because the fate of its sister republics intimately affected its own security.This proved to be an enduring definition of policy, because for many years there was a real institutional difference between the American hemisphere and the rest of the world and because oceanic boundaries were the most substantial that the world affords.
Adams, however, would have been the last to claim that his method of securing the fundamental purposes of the United States was itself fundamental.It is particularly important for Americans to make a distinction between the things which they have always wished to obtain and the methods which they have from time to time used.To build a policy today on the alleged isolation of the American continents would be almost as absurd as to try to build a government on the belief in Divine Right.The American continents are no longer separated from the rest of the world by their national institutions, because the spirit of these institutions has permeated much of Europe, Asia, and even Africa.
No boundaries, not even oceans, can today prohibit international interference.But while the particular method followed in 1823is no longer appropriate, the ends which the United States set out to attain have remained the same.Independence, absolute and complete, including the absence of all entanglements which might draw the country into other peoples' quarrels; the recognition of a similar independence in all other peoples, which involves both keeping its own hands off and also strongly disapproving of interference by one nation with another--these have been the guiding principles of the United States.These principles the Government has maintained by such means as seemed appropriate to the time.In colonial days the people of America fought in courts for their charter rights; at the time of the Revolution, by arms for their independence from England; during the Napoleonic wars, for their independence from the whole system of Europe.The Monroe Doctrine declared that to maintain American independence from the European system it was necessary that the European system be excluded from the Americas.In entering the Great War in the twentieth century the United States has recognized that the system of autocracy against which Monroe fulminated must disappear from the entire world if, under modern industrial conditions, real independence is to exist anywhere.
It is the purpose of the following chapters to trace the expansion of American interests in the light of the Monroe Doctrine and to explain those controversies which accompanied this growth and taxed the diplomatic resources of American Secretaries of State from the times of Adams and Webster and Seward to those of Blaine and Hay and Elihu Root.The diplomacy of the Great War is reserved for another volume in this Series.
