From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its existence.For, let the conception be ever so complete, and containing a statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of it has nothing to do with all this, but only with thew question whether such a thing is given, so that the perception of it can in every case precede the conception.For the fact that the conception of it precedes the perception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence; it is perception which presents matter to the conception, that is the sole criterion of reality.Prior to the perception of the thing, however, and therefore comparatively a priori, we are able to cognize its existence, provided it stands in connection with some perceptions according to the principles of the empirical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the analogies of perception.For, in this case, the existence of the supposed thing is connected with our perception in a possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive.Thus, we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of the attraction of the steel-filings by the magnet, although the constitution of our organs renders an immediate perception of this matter impossible for us.For, according to the laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute- but this obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in general.Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws, extend.If we do not set out from experience, or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain.Idealism, however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately.This is, therefore, the proper place for its refutation.
REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
Idealism- I mean material idealism- is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible.The first is the problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, "Iam." The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination.The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property of things in themselves; for in that case it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity.But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental aesthetic.Problematical idealism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown.The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies.For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.
THEOREM.
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space.
PROOF
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time.All determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception.But this permanent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something.It follows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing without me.Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things external to me.
Now, consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time.
Hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the condition of determination in time.
That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me.
Remark I.The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice.It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things.
