Pro.I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech.
Soc.We must keep up our spirits;-let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn.
Pro.And what is this life of mind?
Soc.I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?
Pro.Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.
Soc.What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?
Pro.Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?
Soc.Yes, that is the life which I mean.
Pro.There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.
Soc.But do you see the consequence?
Pro.To be sure I do.The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.
Soc.Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.
Pro.Certainly that seems to be true.
Soc.And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?
Phi.Neither is your "mind" the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.
Soc.Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my "mind"; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise.
However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place.For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good.And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure.And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.
Pro.Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall;in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low.I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim.And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.
Soc.Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?
Pro.Nonsense, Socrates.
Soc.Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?
Pro.Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument.
Soc.Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just at present not at all an easy one.For in going to war in the cause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones may do again.And must I then finish the argument?
Pro.Of course you must.
Soc.Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.
Pro.What do you mean?
Soc.Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do not object, into three classes.
Pro.Upon what principle would you make the division?
Soc.Let us take some of our newly-found notions.
Pro.Which of them?
Soc.Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?
Pro.Certainly.
Soc.Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them; but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration.
Pro.What do you mean, my good friend?
Soc.I say that a fourth class is still wanted.
Pro.What will that be?
Soc.Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others.
Pro.And would you like to have a fifth dass or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?
Soc.Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have it.
Pro.Certainly.
Soc.Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.
Pro.If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I might be able to follow you.
Soc.Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.
Pro.I agree.
Soc.And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and controverted.When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end.
Pro.That is most true.
Soc.Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less.
Pro.Yes.
Soc.Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be infinite.
Pro.Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.
