89 Whether it be not true, that before the end of July, 1719, they had fabricated four hundred millions of livres in bank-notes, to which they added the sum of one hundred and twenty millions more on the twelfth of September following, also the same sum of one hundred and twenty millions on the twenty-fourth of 3 October, and again on the twenty-ninth of December, in the same year, the farther sum of three hundred and sixty millions, making the whole, from an original stock of six millions, mount, within the compass of one year, to a thousand millions of livres?
90 Whether on the twenty-eighth of February, 1720, the king did not make an union of the bank with the united company of the East and West Indies, which from that time had the administration and profits of the Banque Royale?
91 Whether the king did not still profess himself responsible for the value of the bank bills, and whether the company were not responsible to his Majesty for their management?
92 Whether sixteen hundred millions of livres, lent to his majesty by the company, was not a sufficient pledge to indemnify the king?
93 Whether the new directors were not prohibited to make any more bills without an act of council?
94 Whether the chests and books of the Banque were not subjected to the joint inspection of a Counsellor of State, and the Prevot des Marchands, assisted by two Echevins, a judge, and a consul, who had power to visit when they would and without warning?
95 Whether in less than two years the actions or shares of the Indian Company (first established for Mississippi, and afterwards increased by the addition of other compares and further? and whether this privileges) did not rise to near 2000 per cent must be ascribed to real advantages of trade, or to mere frenzy?
96 Whether, from first to last, there were not fabricated bank bills, of one kind or other, to the value of more than two thousand and six hundred millions of livres, or one hundred and thirty millions sterling?
97 Whether the credit of the bank did not decline from its union with the Indian Company?
98 Whether, notwithstanding all the above-mentioned extraordinary measures, the bank bills did not still pass at par with gold and silver to May, 1720, when the French king thought fit, by a new act of council, to make a reduction of their value, which proved a fatal blow, the effects whereof, though soon retracted, no subsequent skill or management could ever repair?
99 Whether, what no reason, reflexion, or foresight could do, this simple matter of fact (the most powerful argument with the multitude) did not do at once, to wit, open the eyes of the people?
100 Whether the dealers in that sort of ware had ever troubled their heads with the nature of credit, or the true use and end of banks, but only considered their bills and actions as things, to which the general demand gave a price?
101 Whether the Government was not in great perplexity to contrive expedients for the getting rid of those bank bills, which had been lately multiplied with such an unlimited passion?
102 Whether notes to the value of about ninety millions were not sunk by being paid off in specie, with the cash of the Compagnie des Indes, with that of the bank, and that of the Hotels des Monnoyes? Whether five hundred and thirty millions were not converted into annuities at the royal treasury? Whether several hundred millions more in bank bills were not extinguished and replaced by annuities on the City of Paris, on taxes throughout the provinces, &c., &c?
103 Whether, after all other shifts, the last and grand resource for exhausting that ocean, was not the erecting of a compte en banc in several towns of France?
104 Whether, when the imagination of a people is thoroughly wrought upon and heated by their own example, and the arts of designing men, this doth not produce a sort of enthusiasm which takes place of reason, and is the most dangerous distemper in a State?
105 Whether this epidemical madness should not be always before the eyes of a legislature, in the framing of a national bank?
106 Whether, therefore, it may not be fatal to engraft trade on a national bank, or to propose dividends on the stock thereof?
108 Whether it may not be as useful a lesson to consider the bad management of some as the good management of others?
109 Whether the rapid and surprising success of the schemes of those who directed the French bank did not turn their brains?
110 Whether the best institutions may not be made subservient to bad ends?
111 Whether, as the aim of industry is power, and the aim of a bank is to circulate and secure this power to each individual, it doth not follow that absolute power in one hand is inconsistent with a lasting and a flourishing bank?
115 Whether the mistaking of the means for the end was not a fundamental error in the French councils?
123 Whether there should not be a constant care to keep the bills at par?
124 Whether, therefore, bank bills should at any time be multiplied but as trade and business were also multiplied?
125 Whether it was not madness in France to mint bills and actions, merely to humour the people and rob them of their cash?
126 Whether we may not profit by their mistakes, and as some things are to be avoided, whether there may not be others worthy of imitation in the conduct of our neighbours?
127 Whether the way be not clear and open and easy, and whether anything but the will is wanting to our legislature?
128 Whether jobs and tricks are not detested on all hands, but whether it be not the joint interest of prince and people to promote industry?
129 Whether, all things considered, a national bank be not the most practicable, sure, and speedy method to mend our affairs, and cause industry to flourish among us?
130 Whether a compte en banc or current bank bills would best answer our occasions?
131 Whether a public compte en banc, where effects are received, and accounts kept with particular persons, be not an excellent expedient for a great city?
