The omissions with which his greatest disciple charges him are certainly significant.We find,says Mill,no reference to 'Conscience,''Principle,''Moral Rectitude,'or 'Moral Duty'among the 'springs of action,'unless among the synonyms of a 'love of reputation,'or in so far as 'Conscience'and 'Principle'are sometimes synonymous with the 'religious'motive or the motive of 'sympathy.'So the sense of 'honour,'the love of beauty,and of order,of power (except in the narrow sense of power over our fellows)and of action in general are all omitted.We may conjecture what reply Bentham would have made to this criticism.The omission of the love of beauty and aesthetic pleasures may surprise us when we remember that Bentham loved music,if he cared nothing for poetry.But he apparently regarded these as 'complex pleasures,'(38)and therefore not admissible into his table,if it be understood as an analysis into the simple pleasures alone.The pleasures of action are deliberately omitted,for Bentham pointedly gives the 'pains'of labour as a class without corresponding pleasure;and this,though indicative,I think,of a very serious error,is characteristic rather of his method of analysis than of his real estimate of pleasure.Nobody could have found more pleasure than Bentham in intellectual labour,but he separated the pleasure from the labour.He therefore thought 'labour,'as such,a pure evil,and classified the pleasure as a pleasure of 'curiosity.'But the main criticism is more remarkable.Mill certainly held himself to be a sound Utilitarian;and yet he seems to be condemning Bentham for consistent Utilitarianism.Bentham,by admitting the 'conscience'into his simple springs of action,would have fallen into the very circle from which he was struggling to emerge.If,in fact,the pleasures of conscience are simple pleasures,we have the objectionable 'moral sense'intruded as an ultimate factor of human nature.To get rid of that 'fictitious entity'is precisely Bentham's aim.The moral judgment is to be precisely equivalent to the judgment:'this or that kind of conduct increases or diminishes the sum of human pains or pleasures.'Once allow that among the pains and pleasures themselves is an ultimate conscience --a faculty not constructed out of independent pains and pleasures --and the system becomes a vicious circle.Conscience on any really Utilitarian scheme must be a derivative,not an ultimate,faculty.If,as Mill seems to say,the omission is a blunder,Bentham's Utilitarianism at least must be an erroneous system.
We have now our list both of pains and pleasures and of the general modes of variation by which their value is to be measured.We must also allow for the varying sensibilities of different persons.Bentham accordingly gives a list of thirty-two 'circumstances influencing sensibility.'(39)Human beings differ in constitution,character,education,sex,race,and so forth,and in their degrees of sensibility to all the various classes of pains and pleasures;the consideration of these varieties is of the highest utility for the purposes of the judge and the legislator.(40)The 'sanctions'will operate differently in different cases.A blow will have different effects upon the sick and upon the healthy;the same fine imposed upon the rich and the poor will cause very different pains;and a law which is beneficent in Europe may be a scourge in America.
We have thus our 'pathology'or theory of the passive sensibilities of man.We know what are the 'springs of action,'how they vary in general,and how they vary from one man to another.We can therefore pass to the dynamics.(41)We have described the machinery in rest,and can now consider it in motion.
We proceed as before by first considering action in general:which leads to consideration of the 'intention'and the 'motive'implied by any conscious action:and hence of the relation of these to the 'springs of action'as already described.The discussion is minute and elaborate;and Bentham improves as he comes nearer to the actual problems of legislation and further from the ostensible bases of psychology.The analysis of conduct,and of the sanctions by which conduct is modified,involves a view of morals and of the relations between the spheres of morality and legislation which is of critical importance for the whole Utilitarian creed.'Moral laws'and a 'Positive law'both affect human action.How do they differ?Bentham's treatment of the problem shows,I think,a clearer appreciation of some difficulties than might be inferred from his later utterances.In any case,it brings into clear relief a moral doctrine which deeply affected his successors.
III.THE SANCTIONS
Let us first take his definitions of the fundamental conceptions.All action of reasonable beings implies the expectation of consequences.The agent's 'intention'is defined by the consequences actually contemplated.
The cause of action is the hope of the consequent pleasures or the dread of the consequent pains.This anticipated pleasure or pain constitutes the 'internal motive'(a phrase used by Bentham to exclude the 'external motive'or event which causes the anticipation).(42)The motive,or 'internal motive,'is the anticipation of pain to be avoided or pleasure to be gained.Actions are good or bad simply and solely as they are on the whole 'productive of a balance of pleasure or pain.'The problem of the legislator is how to regulate actions so as to incline the balance to the right side.His weapons are 'sanctions'which modify 'motives.'What motives,then,should be strengthened or checked?
