The physicist at least supposes his atoms to have definite space relations,but there is nothing clearly corresponding to space in the 'ideas.'They are capable of nothing but co-existence,sequence,and likeness;but the attempt to explain the meaning of those words ends in nothing but repeating them.One result is the curious combination of the absolute and the indefinitely variable.We get absolute statements because the ultimate constituents are taken to be absolutely constant.We have indefinite variability because they may be collocated in any conceivable or inconceivable way.This becomes evident when we have to do with organisms of any kind:with characters or societies an organism varies,but varies along definite lines.But,on Mill's showing,the organic Relations correspond to the indefinitely variable.Education is omnipotent;state constitutions can be manufactured at will,and produce indefinite consequences.And yet he can lay down laws of absolute validity,because he seems to be deducing them from one or two formulae corresponding to the essential and invariable properties of the ultimate unit --whether man or ideas.From this follows,too,the tendency to speak as if human desires corresponded to some definite measurable things,such as utility in ethics,value in political economy,and self-interest in politics.This point appears in the application of Mill's theories to the moral sciences.
III.JAMES MILL'S ETHICS
James Mill in his ethical doctrine follows Bentham with little variation;but he shows very clearly what was the psychology which Bentham virtually assumed.I may pass very briefly over Mill's theory of conduct 93in general.The 'phenomena of thought,'he says,may be divided into the 'intellectual'and the 'active'powers.Hitherto he has considered 'sensations'and 'ideas'merely as existing;he will now consider them as 'exciting to action.'94The phenomena consist in both cases of sensations and ideas,combined into 'clusters,'and formed into trains 'according to the sense laws.'We have now to consider the ideas as active,and 'to demonstrate the simple laws into which the phenomena of human life,so numerous and apparently so diversified,may all be easily resolved.'
A desire is an 'idea'of a pleasant sensation;an 'aversion'an idea of painful sensation.The idea and the sensation are not two things,but two names for the same thing.
Desire,again,has a 'tacit reference to future time'when applied to a given case.We associate these pains and pleasures with the causes;and in the important case our own actions are the causes.Thus the association produces the motive,and the readiness to obey the motive is,as Bentham says,the 'disposition.'Then,following Hartley,Mill explains the will.
Bodily actions are muscular contractions,which are slowly coordinated by habit-association,of course,acting at every stage of the process.
Now,it is a plain fact that muscular contractions follow 'ideas.'It is easy,then,to see how the 'idea of a pleasure should excite the idea of the action which is the cause of it;and how,when the idea exists,the action should follow.'95An 'end'is a pleasure desired,and gives the 'motive.'When we start from the motive and get the pleasure the same association is called 'will.''Free-will'is of course nonsense.
We have a full account of the human mechanism,and can see that it is throughout worked by association,admitting the primary fact of experience that the idea causes the muscular contraction.
This,and the ethical conclusions which follow,substantially coincide with Bentham's doctrine,or supply the first principles from which Bentham might be deduced.A fuller exposition of the ethics is given in the Fragment on Mackintosh .Mackintosh,in 1829,wrote a Dissertation upon 'Ethical Philosophy,'for the Encyclopaedia Britannica .96The book stirred Mill's 'indignation against an evil-doer.'97He wrote a Fragment on Mackintosh,which was suppressed for a time in consequence of his antagonist's death in 1832,but published in the year of his own death,1835.98According to Professor Bain,the book was softened in consequence of remonstrances from Bickersteth.It would be curious to see the previous version.Professor Bain says that there are 'thousands'of books which contain 'far worse severities of language.'I confess that I cannot remember quite 'a thousand.'It is at least difficult to imagine more unmitigated expressions of contempt and aversion.Mackintosh,says Mill,uses 'macaroni phrases,''tawdry talk,''gabble';he gets 'beyond drivelling'into something more like 'raving';he 'deluges'us with 'unspeakable nonsense.''Good God!'sums up the comment which can be made upon one sentence.99Sir James,he declares,'has got into an intellectual state so thoroughly depraved that I doubt whether a parallel to it is possible to be found.'100'There is scarcely a mention of Mackintosh without an insult.A partial explanation of Mill's wrath may be suggested by the chapter upon Bentham.Mackintosh there accused the Utilitarians generally of 'wantonly wounding the most respectable feelings of mankind,'of 'clinging to opinions because they are obnoxious,'of taking themselves to be a 'chosen few,'despising the multitude,and retorting the dislike which their arrogance has provoked by using still more exasperating language.101He suggested that they should do more justice to 'the Romillys and the Broughams,'who had been the real and judicious reformers;and he illustrated the errors of Bentham by especial reference to Mill's arguments upon government and education.
