Admitting that association may impel us to conduct which involves self-sacrifice，we may still ask whether such conduct is reasonable.Association produces belief in error as well as in truth.If I love a man because he is useful and continue to love him when he can no longer be useful，am I not misguided？
If I wear a ragged coat，because it was once smart，my conduct is easily explained as a particular kind of folly.If I am good to my old mother when she can no longer nurse me，am I not guilty of a similar folly？In short，a man who inferred from Mill's principles that he would never do good without being paid for it，would be hardly inconsistent.Your associations，Mill would say，are indissoluble.He might answer，I will try --it is surely not so hard to dissolve a tie of gratitude！Granting，in short，that Mill gives an account of such virtue as may be made of enlightened self-interest，he does not succeed in making intelligible the conduct which alone deserves the name of virtuous.The theory always halts at the point where something more is required than an external sanction，and supposes a change of character as well as a wider calculation of personal interest.
The imperfection of this theory may be taken for granted.It has been exposed by innumerable critics.
It is more important to observe one cause of the imperfection.Mill's argument contains an element of real worth.It may be held to represent fairly the historical development of morals.That morality is first conceived as an external law deriving its sanctity from authority；that it is directed against obviously hurtful conduct；and that it thus serves as a protection under which the more genuine moral sentiments can develop themselves，Ibelieve to be in full accordance with sound theories of ethics.But Mill was throughout hampered by the absence of any theory of evolution.He had to represent a series of changes as taking place in the individual which can only be conceived as the product of a long and complex social change.
He is forced to represent the growth of morality as an accretion of new 'ends'due to association，not as an intrinsic development of the character itself.He has to make morality out of atomic sensations and ideas collected in clusters and trains without any distinct reference to the organic constitution of the individual or of society，and as somehow or other deducible from the isolated human being，who remains a constant，though he collects into groups governed by external sanctions.He sees that morality is formed somehow or other，but he cannot show that it is either reasonable or an essential fact of human nature.Here，again，we shall see what problem was set to his son，Finally，if Mill did not explain ethical theory satisfactorily，it must be added in common justice that he was himself an excellent example of the qualities for which he tried to account.A life of devotion to public objects and a conscientious discharge of private duties is just the phenomenon for which a cluster of 'ideas'and 'associations'seems to be an inadequate account.How，it might have been asked，do you explain James Mill？His main purpose，too，was to lay down a rule of duty，almost mathematically ascertainable，and not to be disturbed by any sentimentalism，mysticism，or rhetorical foppery.If，in the attempt to free his hearers from such elements，he ran the risk of reducing morality to a lower level and made it appear as unamiable as sound morality can appear，it must be admitted that in this respect too his theories reflected his personal character.
Notes ：
1.For an account of these writers and their relation to the pre-revolutionary schools，see Les Idéologues by F.Picavet (1891).
2.Macvey Napier's Correspondence ，p.424.
3.Charles Fran?ois Dominique de Villers (1767-1815)was a French officer，who emigrated in 1792，and took refuge at Lübeck.He became profoundly interested in German life and literature，and endeavoured to introduce a knowledge of German speculation to his countrymen.His chief books were this exposition of Kant and an essay upon the Reformation of Luther (1803)，which went through several editions，and was translated by James Mill in 1805.
An interesting account of Villers is in the Biographie Universelle .
4.See Cockburn's Memorials for a good notice of this.
5.Stewart's Works ，iv，345.
6.Lady Holland's Life of Smith ，ii，388.
7.Inquiry into the Relations of Cause and Effect (third edition)，pp.178，180，and part iv，sec.6.
8.Examination of Hamilton (fourth edition)，p.379.
9.Cause and Effect ，pp.184-87.
10.Cause and Effect ，p.197.
11.Ibid.p.239seq.
12.Ibid.p.244.
13.Ibid.p.150.
14.Ibid.p.357.
15.Cause and Effect ，p.313.
16.Cause and Effect ，p.482.Brown thinks that we can logically disprove the existence of motion by the hare and tortoise argument，and should therefore disregard logic.
17.Brown's Lecture ，(1851)，p.167，Lect.xxvi.
18.Lecture xxv.This question as to whether Brown had or had not grossly misrepresented Reid and other philosophers，let to an entangled argument，in which Mill defended Brown against Hamilton.I will not ask whether Reid was a 'natural realist'or a 'cosmothetic idealist，'or what Descartes or Arnauld thought about the question.
19.Reid's Works ，p.128.
20.Lectures ，pp.150，158-59.
21.Dissertations ，p.98.Compare Brown's Twenty-fourth Lecture with Tracy's Idéologie ，ch.vii，and the account of the way in which the infant learns from resistance to infer a cause，and make of the cause un être qui n'est pas moi.
The resemblance is certainly close.Brown was familiar with French literature，and shows it by many quotations，though he does not ，I think，refer to Tracy.Brown，it must be noticed，did not himself publish his lectures，and a professor is not bound to give all his sources in popular lectures.
