However,practically no one in this connection has considered the passage in the Hay MS or the statement in Riddle.Putting these together and remembering the general situation of the first week of April there arises a very plausible argument for accepting the main fact in Baldwin's version of his conference and concluding that Botts either misunderstood Lincoln (as Baldwin says he did)or got the matter twisted in memory.Afurther bit of plausibility is the guess that Lincoln talked with Botts not only of the interview with Baldwin but also of the earlier interview mentioned by Riddle and that the two became confused in recollection.
To venture on an assumption harmonizing these confusions.When Lincoln came to Washington,being still in his delusion that slavery was the issue and therefore that the crisis was "artificial,"he was willing to make almost any concession,and freely offered to evacuate Sumter if thereby he could induce Virginia to drop the subject of secession.Even later,when he was beginning to appreciate the real significance of the moment,he was still willing to evacuate Sumter if the issue would not be pushed further in the Border States,that is,if Virginia would not demand a definite concession of the right of secession.Up to this point I can not think that he had taken seriously Seward's proposed convention of the States and the general discussion of permanent Federal relations that would be bound to ensue.But now he makes his fateful discovery that the issue is not slavery but sovereignty.He sees that Virginia is in dead earnest on this issue and that a general convention will necessarily involve a final discussion of sovereignty in the United States and that the price of the Virginia Amendment will be the concession of the right of secession.On this assumption it is hardly conceivable that he offered to evacuate Sumter as late as the fourth of April.The significance therefore of the Baldwin interview would consist in finally convincing Lincoln that he could not effect any compromise without conceding the principle of state sovereignty.As this was the one thing he was resolved never to concede there was nothing left him but to consider what course would most strategically renounce compromise.
Therefore,when it was known at Washington a day or two later that Port Pickens was in imminent danger of being taken by the Confederates (see note 24),Lincoln instantly concentrated all his energies on the relief of Sumter.All along he had believed that one of the forts must be held for the purpose of "a clear indication of policy,"even if the other should be given up "as a military necessity."Lincoln,VI,301.His purpose,therefore,in deciding on the ostentatious demonstration toward Sumter was to give notice to the whole country that he made no concessions on the matter of sovereignty.In a way it was his answer to the Virginia compromise.
At last the Union party in Virginia sent a delegation to confer with Lincoln.It did not arrive until Sumter had been fired upon.Lincoln read to them a prepared statement of policy which announced his resolution to make war,if necessary,to assert the national sovereignty.Lincoln,VI,243-245.
The part of Montgomery in this tangled episode is least understood of the three.With Washington Montgomery had no official communication.Both Lincoln and Seward refused to recognize commissioners of the Confederate government Whether Seward as an individual went behind the back of himself as an official and personally deceived the commissioners is a problem of his personal biography and his private morals that has no place in this discussion.Between Montgomery and Richmond there was intimate and cordial communication from the start.
At first Montgomery appears to have taken for granted that the Secessionist party at Richmond was so powerful that there was little need for the new government to do anything but wait But a surprise was in store for it During February and March its agents reported a wide-spread desire in the South to compromise on pretty nearly any terms that would not surrender the central Southern idea of state sovereignty.Thus an illusion of that day--as of this--was exploded,namely the irresistibility of economic solidarity.Sentimental and constitutional forces were proving more powerful than economics.Thereupon Montgomery's problem was transformed.Its purpose was to build a Southern nation and it had believed hitherto that economic forces had put into its hands the necessary tools.Now it must throw them aside and get possession of others.It must evoke those sentimental and constitutional forces that so many rash statesmen have always considered negligible.Consequently,for the South no less than for the North,the issue was speedily shifted from slavery to sovereignty.Just how this was brought about we do not yet know.Whether altogether through foresight and statesmanlike deliberation,or in part at least through what might almost be called accidental influences,is still a little uncertain.The question narrows itself to this:why was Sumter fired upon precisely when it was?There are at least three possible answers.
(1)That the firing was dictated purely by military necessity.
A belief that Lincoln intended to reinforce as well as to supply Sumter,that if not taken now it could never be taken,may have been the over-mastering idea in the Confederate Cabinet.The reports of the Commissioners at Washington were tinged throughout by the belief that Seward and Lincoln were both double-dealers.Beauregard,in command at Charleston,reported that pilots had come in from the sea and told him of Federal war-ships sighted off the Carolina coast.O.R.
297,300,301,304,305.
