And this,they came very near doing.On their double issue they rallied enough support to increase their number in Congress by thirty-three.Had not the moment been so tragic,nothing could have been more amusing than the helpless wrath of the Jacobins caught in their own trap,compelled to gnaw their tongues in silence,while the Democrats,paraphrasing their own arguments,hurled defiant at Lincoln.
Men of intellectual courage might have broken their party ranks,daringly applied Lincoln's own maxim "stand with any one who stands right,"and momentarily joined the Democrats in their battle against the two proclamations.But in American politics,with a few glorious exceptions,courage of this sort has never been the order of the day.The Jacobins kept their party line;bowed their heads to the storm;and bided their time.In the Senate,an indiscreet resolution commending the Emancipation Proclamation was ordered to be printed,and laid on the table.[2]In the House,party exigencies were more exacting.Despite the Democratic successes,the Republicans still had a majority.When the Democrats made the repudiation of the President a party issue,arguing on those very grounds that had aroused the eloquence of Stevens and the rest--why,what's the Constitution between friends!Or between political enemies?The Democrats forced all the Republicans into one boat by introducing a resolution "That the policy of emancipation as indicated in that Proclamation is an assumption of powers dangerous to the rights of citizens and to the perpetuity of a free people."The resolution was rejected.Among those who voted NO was Stevens.[3]Indeed,the star of the Jacobins was far down on the horizon.
But the Jacobins were not the men to give up the game until they were certainly in the last ditch.Though their issues had been slipped out of their hands;though for the moment at least,it was not good policy to fight the President on a principle;it might still be possible to recover their prestige on some other contention.The first of January was approaching.The final proclamation of emancipation would bring to an end the temporary alliance of the Administration and the Abolitionists.Who could say what new pattern of affairs the political kaleidoscope might not soon reveal?
Surely the Jacobin cue was to busy themselves,straightway,making trouble for the President.Principles being unavailable,practices might do.And who was satisfied with the way the war was going?To rouse the party against the Administration on the ground of inefficient practices,of unsatisfactory military progress,might be the first step toward regaining their former dominance.
There was a feather in the wind that gave them hope.The ominous first paragraph of the Emancipation Proclamation was evidence that the President was still stubbornly for his own policy;that he had not surrendered to the opposite view.But this was not their only strategic hope.Lincoln's dealings with the army between September and December might,especially if anything in his course proved to be mistaken,deliver him into their hands.
Following Antietam,Lincoln had urged upon McClellan swift pursuit of Lee.His despatches were strikingly different from those of the preceding spring.That half apologetic tone had disappeared.Though they did not command,they gave advice freely.The tone was at least that of an equal who,while not an authority in this particular matter,is entitled to express his views and to have them taken seriously.
"You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness?Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing?Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess and act upon that claim ...one of the standard maxims of war,as you know,is to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own.You seem to act as if this applies against you,but can not apply in your favor.Change positions with the enemy and think you not he would break your communications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours...
"If he should move northward,I would follow him closely,holding his communications.if he should prevent your seizing his communications and move toward Richmond;I would press closely to him,fight him if a favorable opportunity should present,and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.I say 'try';if we never try we shall never succeed..
..We should not operate so as to merely drive him away..
..This letter is in no sense an order."[4]
But once more the destiny that is in character intervened,and McClellan's tragedy reached its climax.His dread of failure hypnotized his will.So cautious were his movements that Lee regained Virginia with his army intact.Lincoln was angry.
Military amateur though he was,he had filled his spare time reading books on strategy,Von Clausewitz and the rest,and he had grasped the idea that war's aim is not to win technical victories,nor to take cities,but to destroy armies.He felt that McClellan had thrown away an opportunity of first magnitude.He removed him from command.[5]
This was six weeks after the two proclamations.The country was ringing with Abolition plaudits.The election had given the Democrats a new lease of life.The anti-Lincoln Republicans were silent while their party enemies with their stolen thunder rang the changes on the presidential abuse of the war powers.It was a moment of crisis in party politics.
