The rest is in a great measure fancy. There are two sets of men; one, in whom the reasoningpower is strong, and who are able to resist a present pleasure for a greater one hereafter; another,in whom it is weak, and who can seldom resist the charm of immediate enjoyment. Of course, itis not in the latter class that the motive to save can be expected to prevail. The class, on the otherhand, in whom reason is sufficiently strong to form a due estimate of pleasures, cannot fail toperceive that those which they can obtain by adding penny to penny, after all the rational desiresare satisfied, are not equal to the pleasures which, in the circumstances we have supposed, theymust relinquish to obtain them. Both the higher and the lower principles of our nature are insuch circumstances opposed to accumulation. So far, as to the strength of the motive which, inthe supposed circumstances, can operate upon the labouring class.
(2.ii.32) What remains of the annual produce, after the share of the labouring class isdeducted, is either distributed in large portions among a small number of very rich men, or among a largenumber of men of moderate fortunes.
(2.ii.33) We have already examined the state of the motives to accumulate when fortunes arelarge; and have found that it never can be such as to produce very considerable effects. We havenow to examine the state of the motives to accumulate, in a society, in which there is a greatnumber of moderate fortunes, without the prevalence of large. In the way of physical enjoyment,these fortunes yield every thing which the largest fortunes can bestow. There are only twomotives, therefore, which, in this situation, can counteract the strong tendency to immediateenjoyment: either the desire of a command over the sentiments of mankind; or the wish to makea provision for children.
(2.ii.34) The strength of the motive to command by riches the favourable sentiments ofmankind will depend upon the effect they are calculated to produce. That is different, in different states ofsociety. In the state of society, supposed in the present case, men are distributed into two classes: men of easy but moderate fortunes; and a well paid body of labourers and artisans.
(2.ii.35) The first class; men with fortunes equal to all the purposes not only ofindependence, and of physical enjoyment, but of taste and elegance, and who at the same time constitute thegoverning portion of society, giving the tone to its sentiments and amusements; are not in thesituation of men whose imaginations are apt to be dazzled by the glare of superior riches. Thepersons belonging to the second, or labouring class, are cringing and servile, where the frown ofthe rich man is terrible, and his little favours important: but when they are placed incircumstances which impart the feeling of independence, and give them opportunity for thecultivation of their minds, they are little affected by the signs of wealth. This, therefore, is a stateof society in which the possession of great riches gives little command over the sentiments ofothers, and cannot constitute a powerful motive for saving.
(2.ii.36) With respect to the provision for children, if a man feels no great desire to make alarger than the ordinary moderate fortune for himself, he feels as little desire at the least to make it forhis children. The provision, which he desires to make for them, can only, therefore, be such as toplace them in the same situation which, is held by himself. He will be anxious to afford to themthe same means for beginning life advantageously, as were afforded, or would have beendesirable, to himself. To this extent the desire of making a provision for children might beexpected to be very general, and it would ensure a certain moderate increase of capital. This maytherefore be considered, as, perhaps, the most favourable state of society for accumulation; withthe exception of those cases in which colonists, with all the knowledge and power of civilizedlife, are transported into a country uninhabited, or nearly so, and have the power of cultivatingwithout limit the most, productive species of land. These are coincidences so extraordinary, andso rare, that, in tracing the general laws of human society, it is only necessary to show that theyare not forgotten.
(2.ii.37) These considerations seem to prove that more than moderate effects can rarely flowfrom the motives, to accumulation. But the proof, that population has a tendency to increasefaster than capital, does not depend upon this foundation, strong as it is. The tendency ofpopulation to increase, whatever it may be, is at any rate an equable tendency. At what ratesoever it has increased at any one time, it may be expected to increase at an equal rate, if placedin equally favourable circumstances, at any other time. The case with capital is the reverse.
(2.ii.38) Whether, after land of superior quality has been exhausted, capital is applied to newland of inferior quality, or in successive doses with diminished returns upon the same land, theproduce of it is continually diminishing in proportion to its increase. It the return to capital is,however, continually decreasing, the annual fund, from which savings are made, is continuallydiminishing. The difficulty of making savings is thus continually augmented, and at last theymust totally cease.
(2.ii.39) It thus sufficiently appears, that there is a tendency in population to increase fasterthan capital. If this be established, it is of no consequence to the present purpose to inquire about therapidity of the increase. How slow soever the increase of population, provided that of capital isstill slower, wages will be reduced so low that a portion of the population will regularly die ofwant. Neither can this dreadful consequence be averted otherwise than by the use of means toprevent the increase of capital from falling short of that of population.
