4. That forcible means employed to make capital increasefaster than its natural tendency would not produce desirable effects (2.ii.40) There are two modes in which artificial means may be employed to make populationand capital keep pace together: expedients may be sought, either to restrain the tendency ofpopulation to increase; or to accelerate beyond its natural pace the increase of capital.
(2.ii.41) The principal means, by which legislatures have it in their power to alter the courseof human actions, is by rewards and punishments. Neither is very applicable to the purpose ofcounteracting the tendency in the human species to multiply. Suppose a law were proposed forannexing penalties to the father and mother of a child, the circumstances of whom wereinadequate to its maintenance; it would not be easy to find a mode of punishing, which would beequal to the effect, without producing almost as much uneasiness in society as that which itwould propose to remedy: neither would it be very possible to ascertain and define the state ofcircumstances which is, and that which is not, adequate to the maintenance of one, or two, orany other number of children. To apply rewards to the case of not having any children, in such amanner as to operate usefully upon the principle of population, would be still more difficult.
(2.ii.42) Legislation, in cases ill adapted to its direct, can sometimes produce considerableeffects by its indirect operation; as when a desire, which gratifies itself in a hurtful course ofaction, and cannot easily be counteracted by reward and punishment, is drawn to gratify itself ina less hurtful or an innocent direction. If legislatures have taken measures, as they very oftenhave done, sometimes by direct, more frequently by indirect means, to stimulate the principle ofpopulation, such mischievous legislation may be corrected.
(2.ii.43) The powerful agency of the popular sanction might in this, as in other cases, beturned to great account. If an intense degree of disapprobation were directed upon the men, who, bytheir folly, involved themselves, through a great family, in poverty and dependence; ofapprobation upon those who, by their self command, preserved themselves from this misery anddegradation, much of this folly would unquestionably be prevented.
(2.ii.44) The result to be aimed at is, to secure to the great body of the people all thehappiness which is capable of being derived from the matrimonial union, without the evils which a toorapid increase of their numbers involves. The progress of legislation, the improvement of theeducation of the people, and the decay of superstition, will, in time, it may be hoped, accomplishthe difficult task of reconciling these important objects.
(2.ii.45) Such are the modes in which legislation can weaken the tendency in population toincrease. It remains to inquire by what means it can strengthen the tendency in capital toincrease. These are, also, direct and indirect. As the legislature, if skilful, has great power overthe tastes of the community, it may contribute to render frugality fashionable, and expensedisgraceful. The legislature may also produce that distribution of property which experienceshows to be the most favourable to saving. Sumptuary laws have been adopted in severalcountries; but it is not easy to contrive sumptuary laws, the effect of which would be veryconsiderable, without a minute and vexatious interference with the ordinary business of life.
(2.ii.46) There is certainly one course by which the legislature might produce considerableeffects upon the accumulation of capital; because it might lay hold of any portion which itpleased of the net produce of the year, and convert it into capital. We have only, therefore, toinquire, in what manner this could be performed, and what effects it would produce.
(2.ii.47) The mode of taking whatever portion it might find expedient, is obvious and simple.
An income tax, of the proper amount, would effectually answer the purpose.
(2.ii.48) The legislature might employ the capital, thus forcibly created, in one or other oftwo ways. it might lend it to be employed by others: or it might retain the employment in its ownhands.
(2.ii.49) The simplest mode, perhaps, would be, to lend it to those manufacturers andcapitalists who might apply for it, and could give security for the repayment. The interest of what was thuslaid out in one year might be employed as capital the next. Every annual portion would thusmake compound interest, and, so long as interest remained pretty high, would double itself in asmall number of years. If wages appeared likely to fall, a higher income tax would be required.
If wages rose higher than seemed to be necessary for the most desirable condition of thelabourer, the income tax might be reduced.
(2.ii.50) Without waiting to inquire, whether a machinery, capable of producing theseeffects, be or be not practicable, we may proceed to another consideration, which seems calculated todecide the merits of the scheme.
(2.ii.51) According to the progress above supposed, the increase of population would berapid.
The progress would also be rapid, in the application of capital to land of a worse and worsequality, or in doses attended with a less and less return.
(2.ii.52) In proportion as capital is attended with less and less of annual return, the, ownersof capital have less and less income. If the income from capital be continually diminished, inprocess of time none but the owners of large masses of capital will derive from it the means ofexistence. This is the extreme state of things to which the operation of the scheme, supposing itnot impracticable, certainly tends.
(2.ii.53) It remains to inquire how far these effects are be considered as good.
