They felt that a longer and superior existence to their own was imposed upon them； they looked beyond them-selves as far as their sight would reach， and so took measures that the State after them might do without them， live on intact， remain independent， vigorous， and respected athwart the vicissitudes of European conflict and the uncertain problems of coming history. Such， under the ancient régime， was what were called reasons of state； these had prevailed in the councils of princes for eight hundred years； along with unavoidable failures and after temporary deviations， these had become for the time being and remained the preponderating motive. Undoubtedly they excused or authorized many breaches of faith， many outrages， and， to come to the word， many crimes； but， in the political order of things， especially in the management of external affairs， they furnished a governing and a salutary principle. Under its constant influence thirty monarchs had labored， and it is thus that， province after province， they had solidly and enduringly built up France， by ways and means beyond the reach of individuals but available to the heads of States.
Now， this principle is lacking with their improvised successor. On the throne as in the camp， whether general， consul， or emperor， he remains the military adventurer， and cares only for his own advancement. Owing to the great defect in the education of both conscience and sentiments， instead of subordinating himself to the State， he subordinates the State to him； he does not look beyond his own brief physical existence to the nation which is to survive him.
Consequently， he sacrifices the future to the present， and his work is not to be enduring. After him the deluge！ Little does he care who utters this terrible phrase； and worse still， he earnestly wishes， from the bottom of his heart that everybody should utter it.
"My brother，" said Joseph， in 1803，[126] "desires that the necessity of his existence should be so strongly felt， and the benefit of this considered so great， that nobody could look beyond it without shuddering. He knows， and be feels it， that he reigns through this idea rather than through force or gratitude. If to-morrow， or on any day， it could be said， 'Here is a tranquil， established order of things， here is a known successor； Bonaparte might die without fear of change or disturbance，' my brother would no longer think himself secure. . . . Such is the principle which governs him."In vain do years glide by， never does he think of putting France in a way to subsist without him； on the contrary， he jeopardizes lasting acquisitions by exaggerated annexations， and it is evident from the very first day that the Empire will end with the Emperor. In 1805， the five per cents being at eighty francs， his Minister of the Finances， Gaudin， observes to him that this is a reasonable rate.[127]
"No complaint can now be made， since these funds are an annuity on Your Majesty's life." - "What do you mean by that？" - "I mean that the Empire has become so great as to be ungovernable without you." - "If my successor is a fool so much the worse for him！" - "Yes， but so much the worse for France！" Two years later， M. de Metternich， by way of a political summing up， expresses his general opinion： "It is remarkable that Napoleon， constantly disturbing and modifying the relations of all Europe， has not yet taken a single step toward ensuring the maintenance of his successors."[128] In 1809， adds the same diplomat：[129] "His death will be the signal for a new and frightful upheaval； so many divided elements all tend to combine. Deposed sovereigns will be recalled by former subjects； new princes will have new crowns to defend. A veritable civil war will rage for half a century over the vast empire of the continent the day when the arms of iron which held the reins are turned into dust." In 1811， "everybody is convinced[130] that on the disappearance of Napoleon， the master in whose hands all power is concentrated， the first inevitable consequence will be a revolution." At home， in France， at this same date， his own servitors begin to comprehend that his empire is not merely a life-interest and will not last after he is gone， but that the Empire is ephemeral and will not last during his life； for he is constantly raising his edifice higher and higher， while all that his building gains in elevation it loses in stability. "The Emperor is crazy，" said Decrees to Marmont，[131]"completely crazy. He will ruin us all， numerous as we are， and all will end in some frightful catastrophe." In effect， he is pushing France on to the abyss， forcibly and by deceiving her， through a breach of trust which willfully， and by his fault， grows worse and worse just as his own interests， as he comprehends these， diverge from those of the public from year to year.
At the treaty of Luneville and before the rupture of the peace of Amiens，[132] this variance was already considerable. It becomes manifest at the treaty of Presbourg and still more evident at the treaty of Tilsit. It is glaring in 1808， after the deposition of the Spanish Bourbons； it becomes scandalous and monstrous in 1812， when the war with Russia took place. Napoleon himself admits that this war is against the interests of France and yet he undertakes it.[133]
