Buell's forethought in concentrating the army within supporting distance of Nashville became apparent on the appearance of the advance of Bragg's army at Murfreesboro, reinforcing Breckinridge's command, which had been left in Tennessee to enforce the "blockade of Nashville." This was another grievance the Kentucky troops had against Bragg.All the Kentucky infantry troops under Bragg were in Breckenridge's command, and they were exceedingly anxious to return to the State with Bragg's army to visit their friends and relatives and aid in recruiting that army.Bragg's distrust of these troops was such that he refused to allow them this privilege, and his action in holding them in Tennessee, just out of Kentucky, did not materially increase his popularity with them.Breckinridge had established his headquarters at Murfreesboro and assumed chief command, with about ten thousand troops under him, over one-third of which were cavalry under Wheeler and Forrest.With this force Breckinridge endeavored to enforce the siege of Nashville, using his cavalry to prevent the gathering of forage and supplies by our troops from the surrounding country.These foraging parties were constantly sent out, going as far at times as ten miles on these expeditions.The main deprivation the garrison suffered during the six weeks of the siege was in having nearly all communication cut off from their friends in the North, and while they received nothing, they embraced every opportunity of sending letters by citizens returning north.The garrison was not willing to remain entirely on the defensive.Besides the numerous raiding parties sent out for forage which were uniformly successful, on the night of the 6th of October, Negley sent Palmer with some twenty-eight hundred troops to attack General S.R.Anderson, who had established his camp at Lavergne with some three thousand men, principally new recruits.Palmer with the artillery and about four hundred infantry to support it, moved directly on Lavergne, some fifteen miles from Nashville, while Colonel John F.Miller with about twenty-four hundred men in his command moved on the road to the right to make the attack on the rear of the enemy.Miller marched his command during the night, captured the enemy's pickets at daylight and moved on the encampment.Palmer opened with artillery as soon as he heard Miller's musketry firing and the latter, pushing his troops rapidly forward, after an engagement lasting half an hour, had the enemy in full retreat on the road to Murfreesboro with a loss of 80 killed and wounded and 175 prisoners.He also captured three pieces of artillery, and the regimental colors of the Thirty-second Alabama.Palmer's command then returned to Nashville.
During the siege of Nashville skirmishing between our pickets and the scouting parties of the enemy was constantly occurring, and the garrison of Nashville was indebted for its safety to the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schrader of the Seventy-fourth Ohio, Inspector of Negley's division, as much as any one thing.Von Schrader was an educated Prussian officer and a thorough soldier.
He established a system of pickets, strongly posted, with block houses for their protection, and then gave his personal attention to it that the pickets performed their entire duty.There was no determined assault on the place at any time during the siege.The only appearance of an attack in force was on the 6th of November, by a body of some eight thousand troops, equally divided between cavalry and infantry, under General Roger Hanson.Forrest, knowing that the Federal force at Nashville was not a very strong one and that by the pursuit of Bragg by Buell's army, Nashville was completely cut off from any immediate support or relief, obtained General Breckinridge's permission to make an attack with his cavalry, numbering over four thousand men, in concert with the infantry under Hanson, numbering a little less than Forrest's command.The enemy's cavalry moved in columns on the Charlotte, Franklin, and Nolinsville turnpikes from the south, while Forrest in person with 1,000 cavalry and Hanson's infantry, pushed rapidly forward on the Murfreesboro pike, arriving at the Lunatic Asylum, six miles from Nashville, by daylight.Our pickets and cavalry were driven in, and Hanson was in readiness to make the attack with the infantry when a peremptory order from Breckinridge was received, directing further operations to cease, under express orders from Bragg.
After skirmishing with his cavalry around the city at the different outposts, Forrest withdrew, greatly incensed at being ordered to desist from the attack when confident of success.
Bragg in leaving a large number of men in middle Tennessee merely to watch the post of Nashville--thus crippling his army to that extent--committed a great mistake.He needed every available man in his army to make the Kentucky campaign a success.With these 10,000 troops, if Buell had left Negley's and Paine's divisions as garrisons at Nashville, Bragg's force would have outnumbered Buell's command before he reached Louisville three to two.With the defeat of Buell, Nashville would have been worse than worthless, proving an incumbrance instead of a benefit.On the other hand, with Bragg driven out of Kentucky, and opening the struggle for that State in Tennessee, the possession of Nashville as a second base of supplies for our army was an absolute necessity.Bragg, however, was correct in refusing to allow the place to be attacked by Forrest, for even in the event of success the non-combatants and sympathizing friends of the South would have suffered in person and property to an extent far beyond what the temporary occupation of the city by the Southern forces would have compensated.
