One of the enemy's batteries was posted in a wood just beyond the cornfield to the front.It was keeping up a brisk fire on Miller's advance, when he ordered his men to charge this battery, which they did, capturing three guns.At the time of the charge the Twenty-sixth Tennessee was supporting the battery.This regiment was broken by the assault, a large number of them captured, with the colors of the command.Sending the prisoners, guns, and colors to the rear, Miller reformed his line so as to hold the ground until relieved by other troops.These being crossed over the river under Hazen, together with Davis's division, Miller's command returned to the west bank of the river and there reformed the division in line, and took position for the night.Negley himself was not across the river with the command during the engagement.
Bragg was deeply chagrined at the failure of Breckinridge's movement.
In his report of the action he says, "The contest was short and severe, the enemy were driven back and the eminence gained, but the movement as a whole was a failure, and the position was again yielded.Our forces were moved, unfortunately, to the left so far as to throw a portion of them into and over Stone's River, where they encountered heavy masses of the enemy, while those against whom they were intended to operate had a destructive enfilade on our whole line.Our reserve line was so close to the front as to receive the enemy's fire, and returning it took their friends in the rear.The cavalry force was left entirely out of the action."Bragg immediately sent Anderson's brigade across the river, which formed in line on the front of Breckinridge's command, and remained there in position during the night.He also sent Cleburne's division over, and placed Hardee in command of that side of the river.Rosecrans ordered Davis to take and hold the line occupied by Beatty's division.Later, all the troops of Crittenden's corps crossed the river and occupied the crests, intrenching themselves in this position.
During the morning of the 3d Bragg ordered a heavy and constant picket firing to be kept up on his front, to determine whether our army still confronted him.At one point in the wood to the left of the Murfreesboro pike the rebel sharpshooters had all day annoyed Rousseau, who requested permission to dislodge them from their supports, coving a ford at that place.About six o'clock in the evening two regiments from John Beatty's brigade of Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments of Spear's brigade of Negley's division, under cover of a brisk artillery fire, advanced on the woods and drove the enemy not only from their cover, but also from their intrenchments a short distance from the rear.
At noon Bragg, on consultation with his generals, decided to retreat, leaving the field in possession of his opponent.At 12.15 of the night of the 2d, after Breckinridge's failure, Cleburne and Withers had sent a communication to Bragg's headquarters, through Polk, stating that there was but "three brigades that are at all reliable, and even some of these are more or less demoralized from having some brigade commanders who do not possess the confidence of their commands." They expressed their fears of great disaster which should be avoided by retreat.This was endorsed by Polk at 12.30A.M., January 3d, "I send you the enclosed papers as requested, and I am compelled to add that after seeing the effect of the operations of to-day, added to that produced upon the troops by the battle of the 31st, I very greatly fear the consequences of another engagement at this place on the ensuing day.We could now perhaps get off with some safety, and with some credit if the affair was well managed;should we fail in the meditated attack, the consequences might be very disastrous."By 11 P.M.the whole of Bragg's army, except his cavalry, was in retreat in good order to a position behind Duck River.His cavalry held the front at Murfreesboro until Monday morning, when they fell back and covered Bragg's immediate front.Sunday the 4th was spent in burying the dead, and the cavalry was sent to reconnoitre.
On the 5th Thomas's entire command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into Murfreesboro, and encamped on the Manchester and Shelbyville road.
The cavalry under Stanley rendered very efficient service on the advance from Nashville.Dividing these troops into three columns he sent the first brigade under Colonel Minty with Crittenden's corps; the second brigade under Colonel Zahm moved to the right, protecting McCook's right flank; the reserve Stanley commanded in person, and moved with the head of McCook's command on the Nolinsville pike.Colonel John Kennett, in command of the cavalry division, commanded the cavalry on the Murfreesboro pike.There was constant skirmishing between the enemy's cavalry and artillery and each of the columns up to the 31st, as the army advanced, getting into position.At midnight on the 30th, Stanley moved with part of his command to Lavergne, where the enemy's cavalry was interfering with the trains.At 9.30 he was ordered by General Rosecrans to hasten to the right and cover McCook's flank.On reaching there he found McCook's new line formed on the Nashville road, when the enemy's skirmishers advanced and drove Stanley's dismounted cavalry out of the woods to the open field.Here he was re-enforced, and charging the rebels routed them, driving them back to their lines.On the 1st Zahm's brigade was sent to Lavergne to protect the wagon trains being sent to Nashville.He had several skirmishes with Wheeler, but finally secured the safety of the train and repulsed every attack of the rebel cavalry.
