As late as the 11th, Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that after he occupied "the mountain passes to the west of Dalton" it would be determined what his future movements would be; and on the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that if Bragg should go to Alabama he must not be allowed to re-enter Middle Tennessee.On the 13th, Foster, at Fortress Monroe, telegraphed Halleck that trains of cars had been running day and night southward for the past thirty-six hours.On the following day Foster sent Halleck another despatch, that Longstreet's corps was reported going south, which Meade on the same day confirmed.Then Halleck sent urgent messages to Hurlbut and Burnside to move to Rosecrans's support.But it was too late.
These commands were many days' marches away, and at that moment the Army of the Cumberland was engaged in the earlier movements of the life and death struggle it was peremptorily ordered by Halleck to encounter alone with its old enemy, under Bragg, heavily re-enforced, while large numbers of Federal troops which might have been within helping distance, had orders been given in due season, as asked for by Rosecrans, remained inactive.
It was not until McCook had received and partly executed his orders to occupy Alpine that the actual facts as to Bragg's movements were developed, and that he was concentrated at La Fayette, there waiting for reinforcements, but strong enough without them to crush the Army of the Cumberland in detail.Rosecrans, when aware of Bragg's movements, grasped the situation at once.Bending every energy to the concentration of his army before Bragg should strike, on the 12th he issued orders for McCook's immediate return, and despatched the same in all haste by courier.Hearing nothing definite from McCook, on the next day Rosecrans repeated his orders and duplicated them in the afternoon of that day.Still learning nothing positive as to McCook's movements, on the 14th repeated orders were sent to him urging him to consummate his rearward movement with all possible haste.After a sleepless night, Rosecrans on the 15th left Chattanooga for the front, to hasten, if possible, McCook's movements.After another sleepless night, information was had from McCook as to the position of his command, and on the 17th the concentration of the army was effected in McLemore's Cove, five days after McCook's first orders were dated.
The delay attending McCook's movements was almost fatal to the Army of the Cumberland.Had Bragg received his promised reinforcements at the date he expected them, our army would in all probability have been completely annihilated in detail.McCook claims that his delay was only incident to the route he was compelled to take to join Thomas.This took him back over Lookout Mountain, to Valley Head, then down that valley, crossing the mountain again at Cooper's Gap, and then up and down Missionary Ridge into McLemore's Cove, a long, difficult road, nearly all of it over rough mountains.This route, McCook from the information received, regarded as the better one to take, as between it and the one on which he was ordered to move, which was a road on the mountain into the head of McLemore's Cove, through Dougherty's Gap.
The battle for Chattanooga would never have been fought at Chickamauga had not the safety of McCook's corps demanded it.Could the Army of the Cumberland have been withdrawn in safety to Chattanooga and there concentrated behind earthworks, as it was later, while Bragg doubtless would have made his attack there, yet the surroundings would have been far more favorable for our army, especially as the troops afterward sent might have reached Rosecrans in time to have defeated Bragg, as he was later at the battle of Missionary Ridge.
But the reinforcements that were hurried from all points AFTERthe disaster, by the officials at Washington were not to benefit Rosecrans.
While the battle of the 19th was severe at times, and some slight advantages were gained by the enemy, still nothing had been accomplished to mark that day's fighting as a great, distinctive battle.The delay on the part of Negley in reporting as ordered, to Thomas on the left, placed that position in extreme peril, had Polk made his attack as ordered at day-dawn on the 20th.Fortunately, Polk slept outside of his lines that night--not as he was accustomed to--and was not awakened as early as he would have been had he remained in camp.For this reason the attack, was not made until after Beatty's brigade had reached Baird's left.While this was too weak to successfully resist the attack, still with this command rallied after it was driven back and aided by the troops sent to its support, Thomas was able to repulse Breckinridge's first charge of the morning.The delay from six o'clock until after nine was of great service to the Army of the Cumberland.Negley's delay in reporting at an early hour with his entire division was owing to Wood's failure to relieve him.Sheridan had at an earlier hour been ordered to Negley's position on his front, but Thomas representing the urgency of the movement, Crittenden was ordered to send Wood, who was only a short distance from Negley.Wood, on receiving his orders to relieve Negley, simply moved forward and occupied the position that had been vacated by Negley's reserve brigade, already started for Thomas's left.On Rosecrans's return from the extreme right, he found that Negley had not yet reported to Thomas, although more than an hour had elapsed since he was so ordered and then discovered that Wood had failed to relieve him on the front.
Repeating his orders in such plain English that there could be no further misapprehension of them, Rosecrans moved Wood's division into position, relieved Negley at once, and started him in all haste to Thomas.Negley did not reach the left until after ten o'clock.
