Rosecrans, impatient at the delay that occurred in the execution of his order, expressed himself very forcibly to Wood, much to the dissatisfaction of the latter.After seeing Negley was at last en route to Thomas, Rosecrans then went to the right and was watching the movements of the troops when the word reached him of the supposed gap to the right of Reynolds, on the left of Wood.Rosecrans's plan of battle being to keep his line well closed up on the left, he directed an aid to send Wood an order to close up on Reynolds, which he did as follows.
Headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland.
Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division:
The General Commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him, Respectfully, etc., FRANK S.BOND, Major and Aid-de-Camp.
This order was written by an officer who had no military experience prior to the war, and, as the order shows on its face, embraced much more than the General Commanding intended it should.The orderly who carried this order to Wood reported on his return that "General Wood on receipt of the order remarked that he 'was glad the order was in writing, as it was a good thing to have for future reference.'
That he carefully took out his note-book, safely deposited the order in it, and then proceeded to execute it." Wood's official report contains the order written out in full.He says that it was eleven o'clock when it reached him."General McCook was with me when I received it.I informed him that I would immediately carry it into execution, and suggested to him that he should close up his command rapidly on my right, to prevent the occurrence of a gap in the line.He said he would do so, and immediately rode away."McCook says, in reference to the movement of Sheridan to the aid of Thomas, which he had just ordered, "Simultaneously with this movement, and much to my surprise, Wood's division left the position it had in line of battle on Davis's left, marching by the left flank, leaving a wide gap in the line." Wood also says in his official report that when he started to execute the order he met Thomas, and told him of his order.He says, "I exhibited my order to him, and asked him whether he would take the responsibility of changing it.He replied he would, and I then informed him that I would move my command to the support of General Baird." The first mention Thomas makes in his official report of seeing Wood is when in riding "toward the crest of the hill," coming from the left, he met Wood on the way, and directed him to take position on Brannan's right.
Later, he says, "About the time that Wood took up his position, General Gordon Granger appeared," etc.This was over three hours after what General Wood styles "the disastrous event of the right"occurred.It seems strange, if Wood was properly executing an order from the Commanding General, that he should try so hard to shield his action by the authority of these two corps commanders, especially when he was under the direct command of neither of them.
General Wood was a graduate of West Point, had been in the army all his life, and knew the full meaning of all technical terms used to describe military movements.The order bore on its face a direction to him to make a movement with his front in line of battle, and at the same time to occupy a position in the rear of the division, on which he was ordered to join his left in line on the immediate battle-front.He knew he could not execute the order literally as given, and from the wording of it must have known that there was some mistake about it.Instead of sending a short distance to the rear, or going himself to Rosecrans and finding out just what was meant by the order, he chose to give it a meaning that it was never intended to convey, and moved to the rear from the front of battle, when he knew, as he says in his report, "although I had not been seriously engaged at any time during the morning, I was well satisfied the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front."Wood says in his official report, "Reynolds's division was posted on the left of Brannan's division, which in turn was on the left of the position I was just quitting; I had consequently to pass my command in the rear of Brannan's division to close up on and go into the support of Reynolds." If "Reynolds's, division was posted on the left of Brannan's division," then there was no gap, and no place for Wood to place his division as ordered, and he knew it.He could support Reynolds, but to do this he was compelled to disobey the first part of his order, which IN ITS SPIRIT AND INTENT WAS TOKEEP HIM ON THE LINE OF BATTLE, simply moving his division to the left.This space by his own official report he shows was occupied by Brannan's division, and with this knowledge he undertook to execute an order that directed him to make an impossible movement rather than ask an explanation of it from his commanding officer.
