It was possible for a Condottiere to obtain the lordship of a district even without usurpation, in the case when his employer, through want of money or troops, provided for him in this way; under any circumstances the Condottiere, even when he dismissed for the time the greater part of his forces, needed a safe place where he could establish his winter quarters, and lay up his stores and provisions.The first example of a captain thus portioned is John Hawkwood, who was invested by Gregory XIwith the lordship of Bagnacavallo and Cotignola.When with Alberigo da Barbiano Italian armies and leaders appeared upon the scene, the chances of founding a principality, or of increasing one already acquired, became more frequent.The first great bacchanalian outbreak of military ambition took place in the duchy of Milan after the death of Giangaleazzo (1402).The policy of his two sons was chiefly aimed at the destruction of the new despotisms founded by the Condottieri; and from the greatest of them, Facino Cane, the house of Visconti inherited, together with his widow, a long list of cities, and 400,000golden florins, not to speak of the soldiers of her first husband whom Beatrice di Tenda brought with her.From henceforth that thoroughly immoral relation between the governments and their Condottieri, which is characteristic of the fifteenth century, became more and more common.An old story--one of those which are true and not true, everywhere and nowhere--describes it as follows: The citizens of a certain town (Siena seems to be meant) had once an officer in their service who had freed them from foreign aggression; daily they took counsel how to recompense him, and concluded that no reward in their power was great enough, not even if they made him lord of the city.At last one of them rose and said, 'Let us kill him and then worship him as our patron saint.' And so they did, following the example set the Roman senate with Romulus.In fact the Condottieri had reason to fear none so much as their employers: if they were successful, they became dangerous, and were put out of the way like Roberto Malatesta just after the victory he had won for Sixtus IV (1482); if they failed, the vengeance of the Venetians on Carmagnola showed to what risks they were exposed (1432).It is characteristic of the moral aspect of the situation that the Condottieri had often to give their wives and children as hostages, and notwithstanding this, neither felt nor inspired confidence.They must have been heroes of abnegation, natures like Belisarius himself, not to be cankered by hatred and bitterness;only the most perfect goodness could save them from the most monstrous iniquity.No wonder then if we find them full of contempt for all sacred things, cruel and treacher- ous to their fellows men who cared nothing whether or no they died under the ban of the Church.At the same time, and through the force of the same conditions, the genius and capacity of many among them attained the highest conceivable development, and won for them the admiring devotion of their followers;their armies are the first in modern history in which the personal credit of the leader is the one moving power.A brilliant example is shown in the life of Francesco Sforza; no prejudice of birth could prevent him from winning and turning to account when he needed it a boundless devotion from each individual with whom he had to deal; it happened more than once that his enemies laid down their arms at the sight of him, greeting him reverently with uncovered heads, each honoring in him 'the common father of the men-at-arms.' The race of the Sforza has this special interest that from the very beginning of its history we seem able to trace its endeavors after the crown.The foundation of its fortune lay in the remarkable fruitfulness of the family; Francesco's father, Jacopo, himself a celebrated man, had twenty brothers and sisters, all brought up roughly at Cotignola, near Faenza, amid the perils of one of the endless Romagnole 'vendette'
between their own house and that of the Pasolini.The family dwelling was a mere arsenal and fortress; the mother and daughters were as warlike as their kinsmen.In his thirtieth year Jacopo ran away and fled to Panicale to the Papal Condottiere Boldrino -- the man who even in death continued to lead his troops, the word of order being given from the bannered tent in which the embalmed body lay, till at last a fit leader was found to succeed him.Jacopo, when he had at length made himself a name in the service of different Condottieri, sent for his relations, and obtained through them the same advantages that a prince derives from a numerous dynasty.It was these relations who kept the army together when he lay a captive in the Castel dell'Uovo at Naples;his sister took the royal envoys prisoners with her own hands, and saved him by this reprisal from death.It was an indication of the breadth and the range of his plans that in monetary affairs Jacopo was thoroughly trustworthy: even in his defeats he consequently found credit with the bankers.He habitually protected the peasants against the license of his troops, and reluctantly destroyed or injured a conquered city.He gave his well-known mistress, Lucia, the mother of Francesco, in marriage to another, in order to be free for a princely alliance.Even the marriages of his relations were arranged on a definite plan.He kept clear of the impious and profligate life of his contemporaries, and brought up his son Francesco to the three rules: