Among the branches of philosophy,I had,at an earlier period,given some attention to logic,and among those of the mathematics to geometrical analysis and algebra,--three arts or sciences which ought,as Iconceived,to contribute something to my design.But,on examination,Ifound that,as for logic,its syllogisms and the majority of its other precepts are of avail-rather in the communication of what we already know,or even as the art of Lully,in speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant,than in the investigation of the unknown;and although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent precepts,there are,nevertheless,so many others,and these either injurious or superfluous,mingled with the former,that it is almost quite as difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble.
Then as to the analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns,besides that they embrace only matters highly abstract,and,to appearance,of no use,the former is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures,that it can exercise the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination;and,in the latter,there is so complete a subjection to certain rules and formulas,that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity calculated to embarrass,instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind.By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects.And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice,so that a state is best governed when,with few laws,these are rigidly administered;in like manner,instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed,I believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me,provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them.
The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such;that is to say,carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice,and to comprise nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.
The second,to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible,and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.
The third,to conduct my thoughts in such order that,by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know,I might ascend by little and little,and,as it were,step by step,to the knowledge of the more complex;assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.
And the last,in every case to make enumerations so complete,and reviews so general,that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.
