But again.If we suppose the civil list to become an insufficient fund for these purposes,by the profusion of some future King (and nothing less than the most extravagant profusion can make it so),or if we suppose that some future King may join to so many ill qualities,as leave him no means of governing but by corruption,a sordid avarice,that renders him unable to open his coffers,even for this use;yet will a very little iniquitous cunning suffice to create funds for corruption,that may come in aid of the civil list.It is natural for men to be less frugal,when others are to pay for their want of frugality.
Our Kings therefore may become more apt to take,and our ministers to advise such engagements as plunge the nation,at every turn,into vast expense,since the load which fell,in part at least,on the crown formerly,falls entire on the people now.But besides this general reason to promote a want of frugality,there may arise particular reasons,of more positive and more pernicious effect.A weak administration,for instance,may pretend public necessity,when private inability alone hath formed the conjuncture;and frequent and extravagant supplies may be asked and obtained,to do,or to undo,by the weight of money,what might have been attained,or prevented,by a little foresight,and by a prudent conduct.
A wicked administration may propose to impoverish the people;to render them as submissive and as abject as the subjects,the boors,or the slaves,in some foreign countries,and to beggar them out of their sturdiness.But there is another view,that may be common to a weak and a wicked administration both.In such an age as we suppose,public money will be easily granted,and public accounts rarely,or incuriously inspected.The ministers therefore,though never so weak,may be impudent enough to ask,and able enough to get frequent supplies,on national pretences,for private purposes.The consequences of this are manifold;for,in general,the more money passes through their hands,the more opportunities they have of gain;and,in particular,they may share,if they please,in every bad bargain they make for the public;and the worse their bargain,the better their share will be.Thus an immense subsidy given to some little prince,who deals in soldiers,or an immense arrear stated in favour of these little merchants of human flesh,may be so ordered as to steal enough from the public to replenish the royal coffers,to glut the ministers,to feed some of their hungry creatures,and to bribe a Parliament besides.Several of these occasional jobs may be,and,no doubt,will be contrived,in such an age,and by such means as we here suppose,and may be justly reckoned as so many auxiliary funds,belonging to the great aggregate fund of corruption.Let us,however,break off from discoursing of these,which may be more easily and more frequently contrived under the present,but might have been contrived under the former constitutions of the revenue;and let us turn our discourse,to speak of that great source of corruption,which was opened soon after the Revolution;which was unknown before it;and which hath spread,since it was opened,like the box of Pandora,innumerable evils over this unhappy country.
The increase and continuance of taxes acquire to the crown,by multiplying officers of the revenue,and by arming them with formidable powers against the rest of their fellow subjects,a degree of power,the weight of which the inferior ranks of our people have long felt,and they most,who are most useful to the commonwealth,and which even the superior ranks may feel one time or other;for I presume it would not be difficult to show how a full exercise of the powers that are in being,with,or even without some little additions to them,for the improvement of the revenue,that stale pretence for oppression,might oblige the greatest lord in the land to bow as low to a commissioner of the customs,or excise,or to some subaltern harpy,as any nobleman or gentleman in France can be obliged to bow to the intendant of his province.But the establishment of public funds,on the credit of these taxes,hath been productive of more and greater mischiefs than the taxes themselves,not only by increasing the means of corruption,and the power of the crown,but by the effect it hath had on the spirit of the nation,on our manners,and our morals.
It is impossible to look back,without grief,on the necessary and unavoidable consequences of this establishment;or without indignation on that mystery of iniquity,to which this establishment gave occasion,which hath been raised upon it,and carried on,for almost half a century,by means of it.It is impossible to look forward,without horror,on the consequences that may still follow.The ordinary expenses of our government are defrayed,in great measure,by anticipation and mortgages.In time of peace,in days of prosperity,as we boast them to be,we contract new debts,and we create new funds.What must we do in war,and in national distress?
