What we have spoken of these four cases of a People electing a Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no Heir but whom it self doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting may be fitly compar'd to those times wherein the Monarch sleepes, for in either the Acts of commanding ceases, the Power remaines: Farthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet againe, is the death of the People; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man: As therefore a King, who hath no Heir, going to his rest, so as never to rise again, (i.e.) dying, if he commit the exercise of his Regall Authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence give him the Succession; the People also electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers up to him the whole Dominion of the Country:
Furthermore, as a King going to sleep for some season, entrusts the administration of his Kingdome to some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having elected a Temporary Monarch, and withall retaining a right to meet at a certain day, and place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a King who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another, himself in the mean while waking, can recall this commission againe when he pleaseth; so the People, who during the time prescribed to the Temporary Monarch, doth by Right convene, may if they please, deprive the Monarch of his Authority. Lastly, the King, who commits his Authority to another while himself sleeps, not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted, give consent, loses at once both his power, and his life; so the people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely dissolv'd, and the power remaines with him whom they have chosen.
XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to any one, or many subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made by Oath, or without it, is null: for all Compact is a conveyance of Right, which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of the second Chapter, requires meet, and proper signes of the Will in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Supreme Power, and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens, That he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd without it. Whensoever therefore it shall appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the Power, the promise must be valued as not made, (i.e.) of no effect.
XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, nature dictating, have oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the SuPreme Power.
We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd from these bonds of obedience. And first of all this happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off, or forsake, but conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other; for what is thus rejected, is openly expos'd to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every subject may heed the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement. In the second place, If the Kingdome fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority, hath now lost it: For when the Subjects have done their full indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands, they have fulfill'd those Contracts of obedience which they made each with other, and what, being conquer'd, they promise afterwards, to avoid death, they must, with no lesse endeavour, labour to performe. Thirdly, in a Monarchy, (for a Democraty, and Aristocraty cannot fail) if there be no successour, all the subjects are discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a case it were impossible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that liberty, which all men have to all things, to wit, naturall, and salvage, (for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the Civill, I mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to Reason, or a Beast to a Man:) Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his soile, which may be done two wayes, either by permission, as he, who gets license to dwell in another Country; or Command, as he, who is Banisht: In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country, because he is tyed to observe those of the latter.
