I.The British Constitution
The English Utilitarians represent one outcome of the speculations current in England during the later part of the eighteenth century.For the reasons just assigned I shall begin by briefly recalling some of the social conditions which set the problems for the coming generation and determined the mode of answering them.I must put the main facts in evidence,though they are even painfully familiar.The most obvious starting-point is given by the political situation.The supremacy of parliament had been definitively established by the revolution of 1688,and had been followed by the elaboration of the system of party government.The centre of gravity of the political world lay in the House of Commons.No minister could hold power unless he could command a majority in this house.Jealousy of the royal power,however,was still a ruling passion.The party line between Whig and Tory turned ostensibly upon this issue.The essential Whig doctrine is indicated by Dunning's famous resolution (6April 1780)that 'the power of the crown had increased,was increasing,and ought to be diminished.'The resolution was in one sense an anachronism.As in many other cases,politicians seem to be elaborately slaying the slain and guarding against the attacks of extinct monsters.There was scarcely more probability under George III than there is under Victoria that the king would try to raise taxes without consent of parliament.George III,however,desired to be more than a contrivance for fixing the great seal to official documents.He had good reason for thinking that the weakness of the executive was an evil.The king could gain power not by attacking the authority of parliament but by gaining influence within its walls.He might form a party of 'king's friends'able to hold the balance between the connections formed by the great families and so break up the system of party government.Burke's great speech (11Feb.1780)upon introducing his plan 'for the better security of the independence of parliament and the economical reformation of the civil and other establishments'explains the secret and reveals the state of things which for the next half century was to supply one main theme for the eloquence of reformers.The king had at his disposal a vast amount of patronage.There were relics of ancient institutions:the principality of Wales,the duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall,and the earldom of Chester;each with its revenue and establishment of superfluous officials.
The royal household was a complex 'body corporate'founded in the old days of 'purveyance.'There was the mysterious 'Board of Green Cloth'formed by the great officers and supposed to have judicial as well as administrative functions.Cumbrous medieval machinery thus remained which had been formed in the time when the distinction between a public trust and private property was not definitely drawn or which had been allowed to remain for the sake of patronage,when its functions had been transferred to officials of more modern type.Reform was foiled,as Burke put it,because the turnspit in the king's kitchen was a member of parliament.Such sinecures and the pensions on the civil list or the Irish establishment provided the funds by which the king could build up a personal influence,which was yet occult,irresponsible,and corrupt.The measure passed by Burke in 1782(1)made a beginning in the removal of such abuses.
Meanwhile the Whigs were conveniently blind to another side of the question.
If the king could buy,it was because there were plenty of people both able and willing to sell.Bubb Dodington,a typical example of the old system,had five or six seats at his disposal:subject only to the necessity of throwing a few pounds to the 'venal wretches'who went through the form of voting,and by dealing in what he calls this 'merchantable ware'he managed by lifelong efforts to wriggle into a peerage.The Dodingtons,that is,sold because they bought.The 'venal wretches'were the lucky franchise-holders in rotten boroughs.The 'Friends of the People'(2)in 1793made the often-repeated statement that 154individuals returned 307members,that is,a majority of the house.In Cornwall,again,21boroughs with 453electors controlled by about 15individuals returned 42members,(3)or,with the two county members,only one member less than Scotland;and the Scottish members were elected by close corporations in boroughs and by the great families in counties.
No wonder if the House of Commons seemed at times to be little more than an exchange for the traffic between the proprietors of votes and the proprietors of offices and pensions.
The demand for the reforms advocated by Burke and Dunning was due to the catastrophe of the American War.The scandal caused by the famous coalition of 1783showed that a diminution of the royal influence might only make room for selfish bargains among the proprietors of parliamentary influence.The demand for reform was taken up by Pitt.His plan was significant.He proposed to disfranchise a few rotten boroughs;but to soften this measure he afterwards suggested that a million should be set aside to buy such boroughs as should voluntarily apply for disfranchisement.The seats obtained were to be mainly added to county representation;but the franchise was to be extended so as to add about 99,000voters in boroughs,and additional seats were to be given to London and Westminster and to Manchester,Leeds,Birmingham,and Sheffield.
The Yorkshire reformers,who led the movement,were satisfied with this modest scheme.The borough proprietors were obviously too strong to be directly attacked,though they might be induced to sell some of their power.
