His Venezuela dispatch, however, was one of the most undiplomatic documents ever issued by the Department of State.He did not confine himself to a statement of his case, wherein any amount of vigor would have been permissible, but ran his unpracticed eye unnecessarily over the whole field of American diplomacy."That distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient," may have been a philosophic axiom to many in Great Britain as well as in the United States, but it surely did not need reiteration in this state paper, and Olney at once exposed himself to contradiction by adding the phrase, "will hardly be denied." Entirely ignoring the sensitive pride of the Spanish Americans and thinking only of Europe, he continued: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."The President himself did not run into any such uncalled-for extravagance of expression, but his statement of the American position did not thereby lose in vigor.When he had received the reply, of the British Government refusing to recognize the interest of the United States in the case, Cleveland addressed himself, on December 17, 1895, to Congress.In stating the position of the Government of the United States, he declared that to determine the true boundary line was its right, duty, and interest.He recommended that the Government itself appoint a commission for this purpose, and he asserted that this line, when found, must be maintained as the lawful boundary.Should Great Britain continue to exercise jurisdiction beyond it, the United States must resist by every means in its power."In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow." Yet "there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor beneath which axe shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness."Perhaps no American document relating to diplomacy ever before made so great a stir in the world.Its unexpectedness enhanced its effect, even in the United States, for the public had not been sufficiently aware of the shaping of this international episode to be psychologically prepared for the imminence of war.
Unlike most Anglo-American diplomacy, this had been a long-range negotiation, with notes exchanged between the home offices instead of personal conferences.People blenched at the thought of war; stocks fell; the attention of the whole world was arrested.The innumerable and intimate bonds of friendship and interest which would thus have to be broken merely because of an insignificant jog in a boundary remote from both the nations made war between the United States and Great Britain seem absolutely inconceivable, until people realized that neither country could yield without an admission of defeat both galling to national pride and involving fundamental principles of conduct and policy for the future.
Great Britain in particular stood amazed at Cleveland's position.
The general opinion was that peace must be maintained and that diplomats must find a formula which would save both peace and appearances.Yet before this public opinion could be diplomatically formulated, a new episode shook the British sense of security.Germany again appeared as a menace and, as in the case of Samoa, the international situation thus produced tended to develop a realization of the kinship between Great Britain and the United States.Early in January, 1896, the Jameson raid into the Transvaal was defeated, and the Kaiser immediately telegraphed his congratulations to President Krtiger.In view of the possibilities involved in this South African situation, British public opinion demanded that her diplomats maintain peace with the United States, with or without the desired formula.
The British Government, however, was not inclined to act with undue haste.It became apparent even to the most panicky that war with the United States could not come immediately, for the American Commission of Inquiry must first report.For a time Lord Salisbury hoped that Congress would not support the President--a contingency which not infrequently happened under Cleveland's Administration.On this question of foreign relations, however, Congress stood squarely behind the President.Lord Salisbury then toyed with the hope that the matter might be delayed until Cleveland's term expired, in the hope he might have an opportunity of dealing with a less strenuous successor.
