9. Another， and a principal defect of the mind， is that which men call MADNESS， which appeareth to be nothing else but some imagination of such predominance above all the rest， that we have no passion but from it. And this conception is nothing else but excessive vain glory， or vain dejection； as is most probable by these examples following， which proceed in appearance， every one of them， from some pride， or some dejection of mind. As first we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside from a cart there， instead of a pulpit， that he himself was Christ， which was spiritual pride or madness. We have had divers examples also of learned madness， in which men have manifestly been distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongst the learned madmen may be numbered (I think) also those that determine of the time of the world's end， and other such points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory as reading of romants may produce in pusillanimous men.
Also rage and madness of love， are but great indications of them in whose brains are predominant the contempts of their enemies， or their mistresses. And the pride taken in form and behaviour， hath made divers men run mad， and to be so accounted， under the name of fantastic.
10. And as these are the examples of extremities， so also are there examples too many of the degrees， which may therefore be well accounted follies. As it is a degree of the first， for a man， without certain evidence， to think himself inspired， or to have any other effect in himself of God's holy spirit than other godly men have. Of the second， for a man continually to speak his mind in a cento of other men's Greek or Latin sentences. Of the third， much of the present gallantry in love and duel. Of rage， a degree is malice； and of fantastic madness， affectation.
11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness， and the degrees thereof， proceeding from the excess of self-opinion； so also there be other examples of madness， and the degrees thereof， proceeding from too much vain fear and dejection： as in those melancholy men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass， or have had some other like imagination； and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless fears， which we commonly observe in melancholy persons.
第一章Chapter 11 What Imaginations and Passions Men Have， at the Names of Things Supernatural
1. Hitherto of the knowledge of things natural， and of the passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give names not only to things natural， but also to supernatural； and by all names we ought to have some meaning and conception： it followeth in the next place， to consider what thoughts and imaginations of the mind we have， when we take into our mouths the most blessed name of GOD， and the names of those virtues we attribute unto him； as also， what image cometh into the mind at hearing the name of spirit， or the name of angel， good or bad.
2. Forasmuch as God Almighty. is incomprehensible， it followeth that we can have no conception or image of the Deity； and consequently all his attributes signify our inability and defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature， and not any conception of the same， excepting only this： that there is a God. For the effects we acknowledge naturally， do necessarily include a power of their producing， before they were produced； and that power presupposeth something existent that hath such power； and the thing so existing with power to produce， if it were not eternal， must needs have been produced by somewhat before it； and that again by something else before that： till we come to an eternal， that is to say， to the first power of all powers， and first cause of all causes. And this is it which all men call by the name of GOD： implying eternity， incomprehensibility， and omnipotency. And thus all men that will consider， may naturally know that God is， though not what he is； even as a man though born blind， though it be not possible for him to have any imagination what kind of thing is fire； yet he cannot but know that something there is that men call fire， because it warmeth him.
3. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty， seeing， hearing， speaking， knowing， loving， and the like； by which names we understand something in the men to whom we attribute them， we understand nothing by them in the nature of God. For， as it is well reasoned： Shall not God that made the eye， see？ and the ear， hear？ so is it also， if we say： shall God that made the eye， not see without the eye？ and that made the ear， not hear without the. ear？ or that made the brain， not know without the brain？ or that made the heart， not love without the heart？ The attributes therefore given unto the Deity， are such as signify either our incapacity， or our reverence； our incapacity， when we say： incomprehensible and infinite： our reverence， when we give him those names， which amongst us are the names of those things we most magnify and commend， as omnipotent， omniscient， just， merciful， &c. And when God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the Scriptures， it is but anthropopathos， that is to say， by descending to our manner of speaking： without which we are not capable of understanding him.
