I did not, however, give a complete exposition, nor did Dionysiosask for one. For he professed to know many, and those the mostimportant, points, and to have a sufficient hold of them throughinstruction given by others. I hear also that he has since writtenabout what he heard from me, composing what professes to be his ownhandbook, very different, so he says, from the doctrines which heheard from me; but of its contents I know nothing; I know indeedthat others have written on the same subjects; but who they are, ismore than they know themselves. Thus much at least, I can say aboutall writers, past or future, who say they know the things to which Idevote myself, whether by hearing the teaching of me or of others,or by their own discoveries-that according to my view it is notpossible for them to have any real skill in the matter. Thereneither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject. Forit does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge;but after much converse about the matter itself and a life livedtogether, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by aflame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself.
Yet this much I know-that if the things were written or put intowords, it would be done best by me, and that, if they were writtenbadly, I should be the person most pained. Again, if they had appearedto me to admit adequately of writing and exposition, what task in lifecould I have performed nobler than this, to write what is of greatservice to mankind and to bring the nature of things into the lightfor all to see? But I do not think it a good thing for men thatthere should be a disquisition, as it is called, on thistopic-except for some few, who are able with a little teaching to findit out for themselves. As for the rest, it would fill some of themquite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt, and others withlofty and vain-glorious expectations, as though they had learntsomething high and mighty.
On this point I intend to speak a little more at length; forperhaps, when I have done so, things will be clearer with regard to mypresent subject. There is an argument which holds good against the manventures to put anything whatever into writing on questions of thisnature; it has often before been stated by me, and it seems suitableto the present occasion.
For everything that exists there are three instruments by whichthe knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is theknowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itselfwhich is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, secondthe definition, the third. the image, and the fourth the knowledge. Ifyou wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance,and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thingspoken of, and its name is that very word which we have justuttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made upnames and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round,""annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has thedistance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third,comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a latheand broken up-none of which things can happen to the circleitself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for itis something of a different order from them. Fourth, comesknowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Underthis one head we must group everything which has its existence, not inwords nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that itis something different from the nature of the circle itself and fromthe three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligencecomes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others arefarther distant.
The same applies to straight as well as to circular form, tocolours, to the good, the, beautiful, the just, to all bodieswhether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature,to fire, water, and all such things, to every living being, tocharacter in souls, and to all things done and suffered. For in thecase of all these, no one, if he has not some how or other got hold ofthe four things first mentioned, can ever be completely a partakerof knowledge of the fifth. Further, on account of the weakness oflanguage, these (i.e., the four) attempt to show what each thing islike, not less than what each thing is. For this reason no man ofintelligence will venture to express his philosophical views inlanguage, especially not in language that is unchangeable, which istrue of that which is set down in written characters.
Again you must learn the point which comes next. Every circle, ofthose which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe,is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhereit has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, hasnothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.
